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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Characteristics and the Social Role of Woman <i>Louis A. Ryan, O.P.</i>	230
Catholics in the 80th Congress <i>Edward S. Dunn, S.J.</i>	254
Observation in the Social Sciences <i>N. S. Timasheff</i>	259
The Verbal Interpretation of Social Documents <i>Paul Hanley Furfey</i>	272
News of Sociological Interest	283
Book Reviews <i>The Proper Study of Mankind, The Present State of American Sociology, Essays in Political Theory, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, Personality in Nature, Society and Culture, Social Organization, Man and His Works, Rural Mexico, Fijian Village, The Criminal and His Victim, Protecting Our Children From Criminal Careers, Economic Factors of Delinquency, Social Disorganization, The Negro Ghetto, Social Adjustment in Old Age, An Outline of Social Psychology, Trends In Protestant Social Idealism, Education For International Understanding In American Schools, Christianisme Et Societe, Short Notices, Doctoral Dissertations.</i>	285
Periodical Reviews	308
Index to Volume Nine	314

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Characteristics and the Social Role of Woman <i>Louis A. Ryan, O.P.</i>	230
Catholics in the 80th Congress <i>Edward S. Dunn, S.J.</i>	254
Observation in the Social Sciences <i>N. S. Timasheff</i>	259
The Verbal Interpretation of Social Documents <i>Paul Hanley Furfey</i>	272
News of Sociological Interest	283
Book Reviews <i>The Proper Study of Mankind, The Present State of American Sociology, Essays in Political Theory, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, Personality in Nature, Society and Culture, Social Organization, Man and His Works, Rural Mexico, Fijian Village, The Criminal and His Victim, Protecting Our Children From Criminal Careers, Economic Factors of Delinquency, Social Disorganization, The Negro Ghetto, Social Adjustment in Old Age, An Outline of Social Psychology, Trends In Protestant Social Idealism, Education For International Understanding In American Schools, Christianisme Et Societe, Short Notices, Doctoral Dissertations.</i>	285
Periodical Reviews	308
Index to Volume Nine	314

Current and back issues of THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW are indexed in the *Catholic Periodical Index*. The index to each volume is bound with the December (No. 4 issue) of each volume.

The Characteristics and the Social Role of Woman

LOUIS A. RYAN, O.P.

"As for the women, though we scorn and flout 'em,
We may live with, but cannot live without 'em."

— JOHN DRYDEN

"Never, we believe, never in the course of the history of humanity, have events required on the part of woman so much initiative and daring, so much sense of responsibility, so much fidelity, moral strength, spirit of sacrifice, and endurance of all kinds of sufferings — in a word, so much heroism."

— POPE PIUS XII

INTRODUCTION

SOCIOLOGY is as good as the social psychology upon which it is based; if it is to appraise rightly the interaction of social groups, it can do so only when it understands the human beings composing those groups. Now the most general division of human beings is that of the masculine and feminine sex; yet strangely enough, while we find much research on the social psychology of particular groups such as social, religious, occupational, cultural, and the like, the current material in sociology and social psychology on the fundamental characteristics and roles of the sexes is woefully meager. Not only general texts in these fields, but also books devoted to the marriage and family relationships, seem weak on this point.

Perhaps the very enormity of the problem is the reason why it has not been treated with thoroughness and conclusiveness. Yet few will deny, in light of the current dissatisfactions with the social relationships of man and woman in and out of marriage, that the subject calls for immediate and sustained research. The present article is merely an introduction to the feminine aspects of the problem, bringing together some of the opinions on the matter, forming an hypothesis, and suggesting such conclusions as may be indicated by the data assembled. It is sincerely to be hoped that criticism and appraisal of this essay will stimulate a number of scholars to undertake a complete and definitive synthesis of the sociology of the sexes.

Of late there has been much writing, of very uneven quality, on the characteristics and role of woman, sometimes referred to as "the lost sex." This material should at least provoke the attention of the sociolo-

gist. Concern of sociology with the characteristics and roles of woman goes back to the very beginnings of the science, though modern sociologists seem to have side-stepped the problem or totally surrendered the field to the psychologists and psychiatrists. For the sake of historical perspective, it might be worthwhile, by way of introduction, to recall the treatment of the role of woman in some of the earlier sociologists.

Comte dedicated his sociological treatise, *The System of Positive Polity*, to a woman. In terms profuse and apparently genuine, he acknowledged the tremendous influence of Clothilde de Vaux upon his whole life and thought. Rarely have literary men been so thorough in expressing their indebtedness to a woman, in this case one who came into Comte's life after he had written *The System of Positive Philosophy*. In his chapter on "The Influence of the Positivism Upon Women," Comte says:

In the most essential attribute of the human race, the tendency to place social above personal feeling, she is undoubtedly superior to man. . . . In that which is the great object of human life, they are superior to man; but in the various means of attaining that object, they are undoubtedly inferior. . . . If there were nothing else to do but to love, as in the Christian utopia of a future life in which there are no material wants, Woman would be supreme (p. 169).

The thinker is socially powerless except so far as he is supported by feminine sympathy and popular energy (p. 173).

Positivism . . . encourages, on intellectual as well as on moral grounds, full and systematic expression of the feeling of veneration for Women in public as well as in private life, collectively as well as individually. Born to love and be loved, relieved from the burdens of practical life, free in the sacred retirement of their homes, the women of the West will receive from Positivists the tribute of deep and sincere admiration which their life inspires. They will feel no scruple in accepting their position as spontaneous priestesses of Humanity; they will fear no longer the rivalry of a vindictive Deity. From childhood each of us will be taught to regard their sex as the principal source of human happiness and improvement, whether in public or in private. . . . The worship of Woman, begun in private, and afterwards publicly celebrated, is necessary in man's case to prepare him for any effectual worship of Humanity (pp. 208-210 *passim*).¹

Much as one might disagree with Comte's positivism and his extremist position, there are to be found in *The System of Positive Polity* insights and suggestions which might be modified and made to do service in delineating the role of modern woman.

Lester F. Ward, the American sociologist whose indebtedness to Comte is more than a little, gave sociological formulation to the role of woman in the statement of his gynaeccentric theory, which is the

¹Comte, Auguste, *System of Positive Polity*, Vol. I. Translated by John Henry Bridges (London: 1875).

view that the female sex is primary and the male secondary in the organic scheme; that originally and normally all things center, as it were, about the female; and that the male, though not necessary in carrying out the scheme, was developed under the operation of the principle of advantage to secure organic progress through the crossing of strains; it claims that the apparent male superiority in the human race and in certain of the higher animals and birds is the result of specialization in extra-normal directions due to the adventitious causes which have nothing to do with the general scheme.² Says Ward: "The idea that the female is naturally and really the superior sex seems incredible, and only the most liberal and emancipated minds, possessed of a large store of biological information, are capable of realizing it."³

Benjamin Kidd, in his posthumous volume, *The Science of Power*, advances the theory that it is not in the fighting male of the race that we have the future center of power in civilization, but in woman.

It is woman who, by the necessities of her being, has carried within her nature from the beginning in its highest potentialities the ruling principle of this new era of Power. . . . The fighting male is through the nature of his history the creature of those short-range animal emotions which are becoming of less importance in advancing civilization. Woman, on the contrary, through her history has ever been the creature of the long-range emotions through which the instant needs of the present are subordinated to the meaning implicit in the long sequences of cause and effect through which maximum Power expresses itself in the social integration.⁴

In addition to these statements of sociologists, we have the whole literature of the feminist movement which, limited by behaviorism and determinism in psychology and sociology, distorted the whole picture of woman's role, though it did secure for her some economic and political advantages.⁵ As we look back over this literature now, it seems overstrained, exaggerated, pro-feminine to the point of being anti-masculine. The lines of Charlotte Perkins Stetson from *In This Our World* are typical of this trend:

Close, close he bound her, that she should leave him never.
Weak still he kept her, lest she be strong to flee;
And the fainting flame of passion he kept alive forever
With all the arts and forces of earth and sky and sea.⁶

²Cf. Ward, Lester F., *Pure Sociology* (New York: 1903), pp. 296-297.

³Op. cit., p. 364.

⁴Kidd, Benjamin, *The Science of Power* (New York: 1918), pp. 209-210.

⁵Cf. Irwin, Inez Haynes, *Angels and Amazons* (New York: 1933); also Beard, Mary R., *Woman as Force in History* (New York: 1946); Lundberg, Ferdinand, and Farnham, Marynia, *Modern Woman: The Lost Sex* (New York: 1947), Appendix VIII.

⁶Quoted by Mary R. Beard, op. cit., p. 27.

Within the past few years, there have appeared a number of writings which reflect, and possibly will project, a growing dissatisfaction with the activities of modern women. Dr. Marynia F. Farnham, M.D., and Ferdinand Lundberg, in their article "Men Have Lost Their Women," contended that at its core, "the goals of feminism are wholly at variance with what women require psychologically for a reasonably happy life."⁷ The authors maintain that because of feminism's great preoccupation with sexuality, it brought about a neurotic, instead of a fundamental, adjustment. "The very failure of sexual relationships on such a wide scale today comes about in greater part because of overstress on sex rather than understress, and lack of sufficient stress on its deep emotional components."⁸

The resulting marks left upon women by the demands they have been forced to meet have been a rising aggressiveness that runs counter to their own natures and insures an endless series of inner and outer self-defeats; a dubious sexual freedom that has covered the right to avail themselves of unsatisfactory sexual promiscuity; loss of a sense of personal stability and security, with resultant sorrowful effects upon the home and upon society; an intensifying competitiveness with the male in his established sphere that can only lead for women to the essential loss of the male — all of which has resulted in a Pyrrhic victory . . . for our times, men have lost their women. And women have lost their men.⁹

Another article which deserves the consideration of every student of woman's role is "What's Wrong with American Mothers?" by Dr. Edward A. Strecker,¹⁰ also published in book form as *Their Mothers' Sons*. Here we find a terrible indictment of "momism" ("Mom" signifying the woman who has failed in the elementary mother function of weaning her offspring emotionally as well as physically), though Dr. Strecker indicates that "obviously there are a greater number of sensible, straight-thinking, psychologically good ones." He attributes a large percentage of the vast number of psychoneurotics (1,825,000) rejected for military service in World War II, to immaturity, and immaturity to the fault of a "Mom" who clings to the "emotional satisfaction she derives from keeping her children paddling in a kind of psychological fluid, rather than letting them swim away from the emotional womb with the bold strokes of maturity." "In most cases, a mom is a mom because she is the immature result of a mom." Far from the least of the mom causes is "our social system and our way of life . . . Instead of censuring mom for her short-comings, we encourage her with mis-

⁷Ladies' Home Journal, November, 1944, p. 133. Cf. also same authors, *Modern Woman: The Lost Sex*, for a lengthier, but less clear development of the same thesis.

⁸Op. cit., p. 136.

⁹Op. cit., p. 139.

¹⁰Saturday Evening Post, October 26, 1946.

placed adoration." The blame for momism is upon moms who raise moms, responsibility-shirking husbands, sexual frustration and general emotional immaturity. These, says Dr. Strecker, are merely the immediate causes. "The basic underlying cause is the social system under which mom is allowed to flourish and flower."¹¹

An even more blunt appraisal of modern woman is found in Dr. Ralph S. Banay's article, "The Trouble with Women." Says Dr. Banay, Director of Research in Social Deviations at Columbia University:

Women have gone too far too fast . . . released womanhood is erupting without complete control over its direction. . . . Woman's emotional aspect simply has not gone along with the rest of her entity . . . Woman's total nature — conscious and subconscious — is comparable with that of preadolescent children and of men inclined to criminal propensities . . . Women do not want full equality . . . Women do not fully know themselves . . . the job that faces women is to grow up emotionally.¹²

Dr. Banay suggests as a primary guide to serve her best interests in all things, she might post this slogan in a conspicuous place:

"Women are not angelic." (Italics author's)

As a final sample of contemporary dissatisfaction with the status of woman, the recent survey of the content of women's magazines, soap operas, and selected books and films by Elizabeth Hawes¹³ might be instanced. With devastating cynicism, the authoress attempts to determine what are the rules for feminine behavior in the United States today, who or what makes them, to what extent they are being obeyed, how these rules affect men, whether woman is a lost sex, and if so is she the only lost sex. She concludes that editors, writers and publishers of printed literature for women imposed a warped, money-dominated, unsatisfying pattern of life upon their feminine readers. After a pointed parody on St. Paul's epitome of charity (*I. Corinthians*, c. 13), the writer concludes that "They (editors, writers, etc.) can speak of anything but love."¹⁴

Amid this welter of opinions on the role of woman, ranging from the exaggerations of Comte, Ward, and the feminists, to the hypercritical journalese of some modern psychologists, it is heartening to hear the voice of the present Holy Father, Pius XII, who, in his address to the Italian women on "Woman's Duties in Social and Political Life" (Oct. 21, 1945), indicated the position of the Church on the role of the women in the modern world.

¹¹*Op. cit.*, pp. 88-93, *passim*.

¹²*Collier's*, December 7, 1946, pp. 21, 74-79.

¹³Hawes, Elizabeth, *Anything But Love* (New York: 1948).

¹⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 277.

Let Us say at the outset that for Us the problem regarding woman both in its entirety as a whole and in all its many details, resolves itself into preserving and augmenting that dignity which woman has had from God.¹³

To detach the question from God and from the order of things wisely set up by the Creator is, in the mind of the Pontiff, to miss the essential point of the question, which is the dignity of woman.

What is this dignity that a woman has from God? It is human nature as formed by God and elevated and redeemed in the blood of Christ. While in their personal dignity as children of God a man and a woman are absolutely equal, man and woman cannot maintain and perfect this equal dignity unless by respecting and activating characteristic qualities which nature has given each of them, physical and spiritual qualities which cannot be eliminated, which cannot be reversed without nature itself stepping in to restore the balance. Further specifying woman's role through comparison of the married state and voluntary celibacy according to the evangelical counsels, the Holy Father says that "every woman is made to be a mother: a mother in the physical meaning of the word or in the more spiritual and exalted but no less real sense. For this purpose the Creator organized the whole characteristic make-up of woman, her organic construction, but even more her spirit, and above all her delicate sensitiveness."¹⁰

To appreciate, then, the social role of modern woman, we should examine her specific titles to dignity, namely, her human nature formed by God and elevated by Christ, and her prerogative of motherhood. (This motherhood is always to be understood in something more than a mere physical sense, for the generation of offspring is common to lower animals, and as such could not be a specific title to greater dignity.) This involves a knowledge of psychology to understand human nature in general and feminine nature in particular; of ethics and culture to perceive the relationship of culture and personality development; of theology to understand creation and the redemption of human nature through sanctifying grace; and of sociology to understand womanhood in the woof and warp of everyday social interaction. Furthermore, the concept of social role may be interpreted either statically or dynamically; that is, what the modern woman *is*, and what she *tends to be*. Moreover, in treating of the human nature of woman, we are confronted by the difficulty of determining what are the specifically feminine qualities as different from those culturally conditioned. Much of the confusion

¹³Pius XII, Pope, *Your Destiny Is at Stake*, English translation, N.C.W.C. News Service (Washington: 1946), p. 3.

¹⁰*Op. cit.*, p. 6.

and contradiction in this matter stems from the inability to distinguish nature from nurture, and nature and nurture from supernatural.

This article obviously cannot treat adequately of all these aspects of modern woman. After indicating the extensiveness of the problem, I should like to concern myself with an hypothesis and some preliminary explorations which may open up avenues of further research. Of the two intrinsic reasons for woman's dignity, namely, her redeemed human nature and her motherhood, only the latter will be considered now. This does not mean that the former is unimportant or irrelevant; rather it is most important, theoretically and practically. Only when the theology of woman is clarified will the sociology of woman be realistic and complete; only when women become more perfect spiritually will they utilize their natures to best advantage. Grace does not destroy nature; it perfects it. Bernadette of Lourdes, as well as Joan of Arc, was a social revolutionary.

Limiting ourselves to the characteristic qualities of femininity as typified in the word "motherhood", we are again faced with a problem of selection. These characteristic qualities — if we are to proceed from the facts, from empirical investigation, we cannot speak merely of psychological tendencies or instincts nor simply of cultural determinants. What exists really is a complexus of psychological tendency, heredity, and environment. We cannot completely isolate the personality from the cultural setting or configuration. We must then deal ultimately with the actions and habit patterns of woman — her virtues, if they are good habits, her vices, if they are bad. To specify these directly and definitively is beyond the scope of the present research. Certainly we may infer the womanly virtues from the description of "The Valiant Woman" in the Book of Proverbs, or from a thorough, comparative study of the lives of great women, past and present.

This article represents the first part of a larger study in which we approach the problem somewhat obliquely; (I) by comparing the observations of selected psychologists, sociologists and social philosophers for some common denominator of characteristic feminine qualities and virtues; (II) by considering the socio-cultural influences which have influenced, for better or for worse, the status of modern woman; (III) in the light of these indicated psychological, characterological, and socio-cultural factors to consider the ideal social role of the modern woman and some means to achieve it. This procedure does not preclude more thorough empirical observation and sociological analysis; it simply indicates the limitations of the present research. If, in light of the above-mentioned considerations, we can weigh the future of the modern woman, dimly perceiving how we can modify existing social institutions

or create new ones, we shall come closer to the true feminism described by Georges Renard: "a rational and considered effort to take a thorough sounding of the nature of woman, with respect both to what she has in common with all human nature and to what differentiates her from the other sex; to appraise with greater accuracy the scope and extent of her powers; to adjust her energies in a more efficient manner to the opportunities of time and place; in short, to allow the woman to realize more fully the potentialities of her human nature, to be sure, but also of her femininity, without arbitrary shackles or artificial inducement to depart from it".¹⁷

By way of conclusion to this introductory section, a tentative formulation of the thesis on the characteristics and social roles of women might be opportune:

1. There are evident biological and psychological differences between men and women; differences which affect considerably the individual functions and social roles.¹⁸
2. These differences are either inherent in the nature of the respective sexes, or they are wholly determined by culture, or are partly the result of nature and partly of nurture.
3. To determine what sexological specifications are from nature, we may proceed:
 - a) from a study of the structure and functions (psychological as well as physiological) of the man and woman — the formal cause;
 - b) and/or from the teleological aspect by determination of the purpose of these differences — the final cause.

Considering only the natural state of human beings, the knowledge of the formal cause would indicate the final cause. A being always acts for an end, and it acts according to its form. Assuming the supernatural destiny of humankind, knowledge of the ultimate purpose of the sexual characteristics would depend upon the revelation of the Creator. (A separate study of the theology of women is projected, in which the texts of Sacred Scripture, and the doctrine of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church will be examined for light on the subject of women's nature and role.)

4. To discover the determination or influence of culture on the differences between the sexes, it is necessary to investigate the socio-cultural factors

¹⁷Renard, Georges, "La femme et la vie administrative," in *Semaines Sociales de France* (Paris: 1928), p. 359.

¹⁸Cf. Scheinfeld, Amram, *Women and Men* (New York: 1943). Findings from many fields of science — genetics, physiology, anthropology, endocrinology, medicine, etc., have proved conclusively that men and women, like all other animal species, are basically different in numerous important respects, and in some ways more than we ever before suspected. These differences . . . extend not only to body construction and to the reproductive organs, but to chemical reactions, organic processes, glandular activity, biological resistance, performance capacities, and social roles. That there is overlapping between the sexes in certain of these characteristics does not negate the fact that every woman, in the sum-total of her biological make-up, differs radically from every man . . . there can be no question . . . that from the biological difference, there must follow certain differences in behavior and temperament" (pp. 370-1).

which operate in a given cultural epoch. This would involve analysis of economic, sociological, political, aesthetic, educational, and religious influences bearing upon personality development and social role.

5. Since nature and culture or environment are interactive, the most thorough procedure would be to combine the psychological study of the nature of the sexes with the sociological analysis of cultural factors related to them. Such a procedure is attempted in this essay.

6. If, from the study of the nature of the sexes, and in this research of women in particular, it appears that some socio-cultural factors promote and some inhibit the full development of feminine personality, then social planning should provide for a society which would enable woman to achieve her proper social role — and ultimately happiness.

I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CHARACTEROLOGICAL QUALITIES OF WOMEN

With these principles in mind, we can now turn to the first section of the study — an attempt to determine the peculiar psychological and characterological qualities of women. In the absence of significant empirical research on this topic, we have to depend upon the conclusions of such experienced observers of womanly nature as have been surveyed thus far. Without a doubt, such conclusions can be colored by the personality of the respective authors; yet it is hoped that a wide selection of observers may indicate certain uniformities in feminine traits which can be the basis of study.

It is well to explain that some authors are speaking of tendencies or traits of actual women observed, while others are delineating what they conceive to be "feminine" traits, ideal constructs which allow of great variety among women themselves, and which may even be found, normally or abnormally, in the male members of the human race. (The "effeminate" man is one who has feminine traits disproportionate to his nature. The "gentleman" has a predominance of specifically masculine traits tempered by such feminine characteristics as make him a balanced human being.)

A fourth caution on this subject has been expressed by the well-known psychologist, Dr. Rudolph Allers. Commenting on the literature describing differences between men and women, he says that if it should be proved

that women more or less consistently fall short of men in some respect or another, it does not necessarily follow that they are lacking in a particular quality, or are fundamentally inferior; for it may well be that the world in which they are compelled to live is unsuited to their nature. Moreover, it must be born in mind that disharmony between a person and his environment can depend on his incomplete preparation for the specific demands and conditions of life in the world in which he must live.

Failure or inefficiency in life, may thus have three causes: natural insufficiency of the person, or, in this case of the group to which he or she belongs; unsuitable nature of the environment; inadequate preparation . . . we must first of all see whether we can refer any shortcomings of the woman as compared with the man to the last two factors; for we are in a position to discover such connections and intelligently trace out their effects, whereas a congenital factor can be established only by a process of elimination. . . .

Our thesis is that a very great number of the traits that are alleged to form part of the nature of woman have risen reactively in response to environment, upbringing and woman's special social status. . . .²⁰

The following collection of observations on the psychological qualities of women is admittedly selective. However, they do represent a fair cross-section of professional psychologists, sociologists, and social philosophers who, by training or breadth of experience, are worthy of consideration. After the various observations have been listed, an attempt will be made to indicate a general formulation of the characteristics of women.

Aristotle, in his *History of Animals*, makes these comments on woman's nature: "Woman is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears, at the same time is more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She is, furthermore, more prone to despondency, and less hopeful than the man, more void of shame or self-respect, more false of speech, more deceptive, and of more retentive memory. She is also more wakeful, more shrinking, more difficult to rouse to action, and requires a smaller amount of nutriment."²⁰

Laura Marholm, in her *Studies in the Psychology of Woman* (1899), insists that it is not enough to study the Protestant woman and the free-thinking woman, "as has heretofore been done almost exclusively, for both of these are in a certain sense detached"; "the Catholic woman still possesses today the connection with nature and the power of emotional expansion both of which are indispensable to the woman." She says the greatest height which man reached in the understanding of woman and the mystery of life was when he placed the Virgin Mother with her Child upon the altar; "in the spectacle of perfect womanhood and the eternal mystery of life, all the creative power of man was lifted to its highest mental and spiritual action." Miss Marholm starts from these fundamental premises; "that the woman, never, nowhere and in nothing, can make or mark a starting point; that all that she does, performs, or suggests represents a deviation, a connection with or contin-

²⁰Allers, Rudolph, *The Psychology of Character* (New York: 1940), pp. 244-246.

²⁰*The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: 1941), "History of Animals," Book 9 (p. 637).

uation of something already produced, existing, done; that in mental spheres she is subject to this law as well as in the physical . . . She has only one quality peculiar to herself; that everything which she receives, pretty or ugly, strong or weak, bright or dull, good or bad, can sprout and grow, — influenced quite essentially by the substance of herself which she gives . . ." Under the figure of the ideal type, the *grande amoureuse*, she lists the marks of the good woman, possessing "all passive womanly qualities — desire to love, devotion to man, reflective intelligence, faithfulness, solicitude, loyalty"; another central characteristic is "an excellent mind", combining intelligence and moral refinement; thirdly, "the warm, full, nourishing passion which she wraps around man, fostering but not scorching . . ." Every fruitful emotion in woman, she says, has a religious impulse; without this motive woman becomes sterile. "The real demand of our times is that woman should enter into possession of herself."²¹

Ellen Key, the Swedish feminist, suggests some peculiarly feminine characteristics in the concluding chapter of her book, *The Woman Movement*. After stating that the woman of the future will not wish to be freed from her sex, but that she will be freed from "sexual hypertrophy, freed to complete humanity," Ellen Key maintains that the proportional ratio of manly and womanly characteristics will on the whole remain fixed.

— the proportional ratio which, in the progress of evolution, gave to woman the ascendancy in regard to inward creative powers, and to man the ascendancy in regard to outward creative powers — a proportional ratio which for the present has made woman more gifted in the sphere of feeling, man more potent in the sphere of ideas; which has made her the listener and yearner in the sphere of the spiritual life and him the pioneer investigator and founder of systems, that has given her more of the Christian, and him more of the pagan virtues. The improvement of the universal, human characteristics of both sexes elevates also the plane upon which they exercise their especial functions, valuable alike for culture. . . .²²

Havelock Ellis, who wrote around the same time as Ellen Key quotes with favor the results of a study of male and female university students by Jastrow: "In general, the feminine traits revealed by this study are an attention to the immediate surroundings, to the finished product, to the ornamental, the individual, and the concrete; while the masculine preference is for the more remote, the constructive, the useful, the general, and

²¹Marholm, Laura. *Studies in the Psychology of Woman*, translated by Georgia A. Etchison (Chicago: 1899), *passim*.

²²Key, Ellen. *The Woman Movement*, translated by M. B. Borthwick (New York: 1912), p. 219.

the abstract."²³ Further in the same book Ellis remarks that "the masculine method of thought is massive and deliberate, while the feminine method is quick to perceive and nimble to act. The latter method is apt to fall into error, but is agile in the prime requirement. . . . It is unnecessary to insist on this quality which in its finest form is called tactfulness."²⁴ After insisting on inadequacy of data and the dangers of generalization, Ellis ventures these conclusions: ". . . the qualities of intelligence in men and women though not of identical character or value, may be said fairly to balance each other . . . Women dislike the essentially intellectual process of analysis; they have the instinctive feeling that analysis possibly destroys the emotional complexes by which they are largely moved and which appeal to them. Women dislike rigid rules, and principles, and abstract propositions . . . women automatically tend to convert an abstract proposition into a practical concrete case."²⁵ As far as the affectability of women is concerned, Ellis shares the general view that women respond to stimuli, psychic or physical, more readily than men. One of the bases of the affectability of women is to be found in the reflexes. "To say that women are more affectable than men, and more emotional, means in part to say that reflex action is more developed than in men and less under control of the higher centres."²⁶

In *A Survey of the Woman Problem*, Rosa Mayreder argues from physiological functions to psycho-social differentiation. It is interesting to note how her deductions compare with some of the very people she criticizes, such as Marholm, Lombroso, and Ellis.

The physiological functions of nutrition and propagation evidence even in the most primitive organisms two tendencies of vital activity, one inwardly accumulative, and the other outwardly distributive. These original tendencies express the peculiarities of the male and female germ cells; and the preponderance of one of these tendencies determines in the embryo a prodigal or a thrifty constitution, a masculine or a feminine polarization. The masculine polarization gives, as the properties of the germ-cell show, mobility, energy, initiative, the inclination to sweep afar and the ability to assert oneself under unfavorable conditions. The feminine postulates stability, passive self-dependence, an inclination to be firm and shut off from outside influences (see Feuillet, *The Psychology of the Sexes and its Biological Foundation*). If we pursue these deductions further, then we may say that the choleric-sanguine temper-

²³Jastrow, quoted by Ellis, Havelock, *Man and Woman*, fifth edition (New York: 1914), p. 220.

²⁴Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

²⁵*Op. cit.*, pp. 261-262.

²⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 405.

ament presents itself as the masculine, the phlegmatic-lymphatic as the feminine temperament; the male sex embodies the progressive or centrifugal element that renews and transforms the species, the female sex the conservative or centripetal, that maintains and preserves the species unchanged.²⁷

Gina Lombroso, in her classic, *The Soul of Woman*, holds that "the fundamental fact which determines woman's attitude toward life is that woman is *alterocentrist*, that is to say, she centers her feelings, her enjoyment, her ambition in something outside herself. . . . Man is not like this. Man, like all living organisms unstamped by potential maternity, is *egocentrist*, that is to say, he makes himself and his pleasures and his activities the center of the world in which he lives . . . Woman's alteroecentrism does not necessarily imply a higher moral standard, since egocentrism and alteroecentrism are both equally capable of inspiring generosity, perversity, self-sacrifice, meanness. It is merely an instinct which stamps the radical difference between the two sexes."²⁸

Woman's alteroecentrism implies three things: *passionality* ("the instinctive attraction or repulsion, often unreasonable, for a person or thing"), *intuition* ("the possibility of foreseeing what the effect of a given action will be on another, before it takes place"), and *activity* ("the desire to do things, to make, to create things, for the sake of doing, making or creating them without any thought of profit or advantage, simply in order to be busy, occupied, active"). As a result of her passionality and intuition, woman has an extraordinary — a) *self-confidence*, which may become obstinacy "as little affected by reason and logical arguments as it is by results of experience"; b) *sentimentality*, going to extremes in sympathy and sorrow, in sacrifices and enthusiasm; c) *expansiveness and sociability*, involving greater exteriorization of her sentiments; d) *personality and charm*, which makes woman much more individual than man.²⁹

Rudolph Allers, in his treatment of the characterology of the sexes, prefaces his consideration of woman's disposition by warning against prejudice in establishing the "normal" and "subnormal" in comparing the male and female sexes. He holds as a fundamental rule of method that "it is not possible to postulate primary female qualities without first of all investigating the possibility of their having been reactively

²⁷Mayreder, Rosa, *A Survey of the Woman Problem*; translated from the German (New York: 1913), *passim*.

²⁸Lombroso, Gina, *The Soul of Woman*; English translation (New York: 1923), pp. 5-11, *passim*.

²⁹*Op. cit.*, *passim*.

determined; and that the emotionalism of women is to a large extent bound up with the factor of discouragement."³⁰

According to Karl Menninger, the thing that determines the woman's distinguishing psychological characteristics is "a relatively greater capacity for receptivity and adaptability."³¹

"There can be no question", says Amram Scheinfeld, "that from the biological sex differences there must follow certain differences in behavior and temperament. To what extent we can classify specific behavior traits as basically masculine or basically feminine is another matter."³² His recent study forced him to conclude that the basic sex differences "were far more extensive and had far more to do with the behavior patterns, capacities, and activities of the sexes, than most persons in professional circles had suspected or conceded."³³ "We saw that little girls tend to be more nervous than boys . . . With maturity, greater repression may continue to produce greater emotionality among women. In addition, the facts that women's hearts show greater excitability, that their pulse is quicker, their thyroids more active, their metabolic processes more uneven, etc., may have something to do with making them more emotional when everything else is equal."³⁴ Johnson's and Terman's review of studies of psychological sex differences indicate that emotional balance seems on the average to be superior in the male.³⁵ "In behavior, generally, women can be expected to conform more to socially approved patterns because they are under greater compulsion to do so. . . . So-called *feminine intuition* . . . to the extent that it exists, is undoubtedly due to this manner in which a woman, from early girlhood on, must train herself to observe any little sign or act which might affect her well-being and relationship with others. Her life is more concerned with people close to her, whom she studies intensively; man's more with abstract problems or with impersonally related individuals."³⁶

From the pen of the psychoanalyst, Helene Deutsch, M.D., in *The Psychology of Women* (Volume One: "Girlhood", Volume Two: "Motherhood") comes a study of the "normal psychic life of women and their normal conflicts". The "essential traits of femininity—

³⁰Allers, Rudolph, *The Psychology of Character* (New York: 1940), p. 268.

³¹Menninger, Karl, *Love Against Hate* (New York: 1942), p. 104.

³²Scheinfeld, Amram, *Women and Men* (New York: 1943), p. 371.

³³*Op. cit.*, Preface, ix.

³⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 213.

³⁵Johnson, Winfred B., and Terman, Lewis M., "Some Highlights on the Literature of Psychological Sex Differences Published Since 1920," *Journal of Psychology*, 9:327 (1940).

³⁶Scheinfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-223, *passim*.

narcissism, passivity, and masochism"³⁷ are developed at some length. Anent the first trait, Dr. Deutsch explains that "since the sexual tendencies of woman are directed toward goals that are dangerous for her ego, the latter defends itself and strengthens its inner security by intensifying its self-love, which then manifests itself as 'narcissism'."³⁸ She continues:

As further traits of femininity we have cited a strong tendency toward passivity and an intensification toward masochism. If we replace the expression "turn toward passivity" by "activity directed inward", the term "feminine passivity" acquires more vital content, and the ideas of inactivity, emptiness and immobility are eliminated from its connotation. . . . "Feminine masochism" follows the same path as "activity directed inward". By analogy we can say that woman's activity directed inward is parallel to man's intensified activity directed outward, and her masochism is parallel to the masculine aggression that accompanies his activity, particularly at the end of adolescence. . . .³⁹

The central trait of passivity is traced back to a mental sequence evolving (1) greater proneness to identification, (2) stronger fantasy, (3) subjectivity, (4) inner perception, and (5) intuition.⁴⁰

In motherhood, the "harmonious interplay between narcissistic tendencies and masochistic readiness for painful giving and loving", characteristic of the feminine woman is transformed. "The narcissistic wish to be loved . . . is metamorphosed; it is transferred from the ego to the child or his substitute. . . . The masochistic components of motherliness manifest themselves in the mother's readiness for self-sacrifice, but — in contrast to the attitude of the feminine woman — without demand for any obvious return on the part of the object, i.e., the child, and also in her willingness to undergo pain for the sake of her child as well as to renounce the child's dependence upon her when his hour of liberation comes."⁴¹

Ferdinand Lundberg and Dr. Marjorie F. Farnham, in an appendix to their controversial volume, *Modern Woman, the Lost Sex*, declare that "basic masculinity or femininity are determined by the emotional attitude of any man or woman to his or her reproductive function. Basic masculinity or femininity is impaired in proportion as acceptance and assertion of the reproductive function is in any way qualified or denied; all other attitudes are colored by this fundamental one toward the reproductive function — the most basic drive after self-preserva-

³⁷Deutsch, Helene, *The Psychology of Women*, Vol. I: Girlhood (New York: 1944), Preface, xiii.

³⁸*Op. cit.*, I, 188.

³⁹*Op. cit.*, I, 190-191.

⁴⁰*Op. cit.*, I, p. 139.

⁴¹*Op. cit.*, II, pp. 17-18.

tion".⁴² "Masculinity and femininity . . . are inner neuropsychic tendencies resting on biochemical constitutional factors brought to a focus in the gonads".⁴³ Mixed in with their somewhat superficial history and even less substantial theology and philosophy, there are some indications of what might be termed feminine characteristics, which follow quite closely the observations of Dr. Deutsch, cited above. While maleness always manifests itself to man as something outside himself, "self-realization for the female is always, in any final analysis, deeply internal. . . . Whereas for the male the sex act involves doing something to someone else, for the female it comes down to something done to her."⁴⁴ The authors argue that the "centripetal character" of woman's nature is by no means a deficiency; rather "the female principle — summarized in the word nurture — has, however, been more emphasized in certain high oriental civilizations like the Indian and the Chinese. There, contemplativeness, passivity, a turning away from the objective in favor of the subjective, have been exalted".⁴⁵

After consulting the ranks of the psychologists, it might be well to seek out the opinions of some sociologists on the characteristics of women. Writers in the field of sociology have been surprisingly taciturn in commenting on this problem. *The Index to Volumes I-XL* of the American Journal of Sociology (1895-1935) reflects how little this problem has been considered by the professional sociologist.

As is apparent from the citation in the beginning of this essay, Auguste Comte had very definite ideas about the special prerogatives of woman. He extols her tendency to place social above personal feeling. "Women's minds no doubt are less capable than ours of generalizing very widely, or of carrying on long processes of deduction . . . they are generally more alive to that combination of reality with utility . . ."⁴⁶ Tenderness and purity are the two essential qualities of woman. Of these "tenderness ranks first, because more closely connected with the grand object of all human effort, the elevation of social feeling over self love".⁴⁷ "abounding as they do in sympathy, they are generally deficient in energy, and are therefore less able to withstand corrupting influences. . . . The direction, then, of progress in the social condition of woman is this: to render her life more and more domestic, to di-

⁴²Lundberg, Ferdinand, and Farnham, Marjorie F., *Modern Woman, the Lost Sex* (New York: 1947), Appendix II, pp. 381-382.

⁴³*Op. cit.*, p. 386.

⁴⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁴⁵*Op. cit.*, pp. 171-172.

⁴⁶Comte, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

⁴⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 182.

minish as far as possible the burden of out-door labor; and so to fit her more completely for her special office of educating a moral nature."⁴⁸

Lester F. Ward, a disciple of Comte, shares his master's partiality for the female sex. As far as specification of qualities is concerned, he concedes to the woman some of the appetent interest of the male, "but this is not usually strong enough to cause her even to move from her place, much less to seek the male. From this point of view she is comparatively indifferent and is, as is so commonly said, the passive sex. . . . The male element is in a high degree centrifugal. . . . The female is the guardian of hereditary qualities. . . ."⁴⁹ On the mental side, Ward distinguishes intuitive reason, "essentially active and aggressive" from intuitive judgment, which is "passive and defensive", the conservative element of mind. He concludes that the two faculties are respectively typical of the male and female natures, and although both sexes use both, women make far more use of the second than men. "We thus seem to have two great coordinate psychic trunks, the positive, initiative, aggressive, and dynamic male trunk and the negative, passive, defensive, and protective female trunk — reason and judgment."⁵⁰

In his *Principles of Sociology*, Edward Alsworth Ross observes that women, being less aggressive in their make-up, are, as a rule, more dependent than men on their present social image, more sensitive to present attitude, cannot live so well on hoarded corroboration, and slow down sooner when opinion sets against them.⁵¹ "Women have an instinct for security, and strive to lessen risk, while men fatuously create it."⁵²

Westermarck holds that "each sex is attracted by the distinctive characteristics of the opposite sex, and coyness is a feminine quality."⁵³ He quotes with approval the opinion of Juan Valera in his novel *Dona Luz*: "The qualities that do most honour to a woman are modesty and decorum, those that do most honour to a man, intelligence and courage."⁵⁴

K. A. Wieth-Knudsen, professor of economics and jurisprudence in the Norwegian Technical College, Trondhjem, in his volume *Understanding Women*, examines the psychical characteristics of the two sexes under the headings of intellect, emotion and will. As far as the intellect

⁴⁸*Op. cit.*, pp. 198-200, *passim*.

⁴⁹Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 325.

⁵⁰*Op. cit.*, p. 481.

⁵¹Cf. Ross, E. A., *Principles of Sociology* (New York: 1920), p. 119.

⁵²*Op. cit.*, p. 677.

⁵³Westermarck, Edward, *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilization* (New York: 1937), p. 139.

⁵⁴*Op. cit.*, p. 149.

is concerned, there are three main elements. First, man has "fabulous delight in capacity for observing everything in his natural surroundings, whereas the normal woman's interest and talent for observation are confined to the persons immediately surrounding her, especially her husband and children. In the next place, man has the outstanding power of comparing all his observations and extracting therefrom the most surprising results, whereby he discovers coherence and meaning in a world which to woman is commonly nothing but a chaotic jumble of events. Finally, man, or at any rate every man above the average, can use this basis to create something entirely new for the service and support of the race in its struggle for existence. . .⁶⁵ The author considers the faculty of *reproduction*, the talent for mimicry, as one of the few intellectual provinces in which woman can compete with man. Anent the emotions, Wieth-Knudsen emphasizes the general shallowness and volatility of woman's emotions and her respect for *results*. Treating of the will under the heading of ethics, the author holds that "woman's inborn capacity for being just and truthful is considerably inferior to man's. . . . She judges persons and things from personal points of view coloured by feeling and passion and can only exceptionally rise to what we men call an objective, purely impersonal view of the world about her. . . ."⁶⁶ His conclusion on feminine qualities is quite sweeping.

According to psychological researches emotionality (which also occurs in men, but in a less degree and in a different way) is closely connected with the following qualities: greater capriciousness, anxiousness, hesitation, fear, long after-effects of grief, short after-effects of anger, craving for variety, frequent change of sympathies, risibility, restriction of consciousness, affectibility and sexual intuitive power; and further, with these qualities: debility of reason, abhorrence of abstractions, instinctive apprehension, sudden irascibility, sense of the family, dexterity, vanity, domineering spirit, gratuitous pity coupled with cruelty, love of exaggeration, trustworthiness, sense for religion and proneness to psychical disturbances. Of these twenty-six qualities, which every student of human nature will admit to be pre-eminently feminine, only three or four at the most can be regarded as really desirable and sought after by the normal type of man.

When he considers sex differences and similarities, Ray E. Baber is very non-committal on the subject of mental and emotional characteristics. He cites, seemingly with approval, the conclusion of Mark A. May of the Institute of Human Relations of Yale University. According to May, since 1900 at least 200 articles have appeared in psycholog-

⁶⁵Wieth-Knudsen, *Understanding Women*; translated from Danish by A. G. Chater (New York: n. d.), p. 42.

⁶⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁶⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 304.

ical journals dealing with supposed mental differences between the sexes, and he concludes that psychology has proved that there are "no fundamentally innate sex differences in abilities and capacities."⁶⁸ Yet Baber's conclusion of the discussion of sex roles implies some differences in sex characteristics. "If women wish to show their ability, why should they not blaze new trails of thought and activity instead of following the trails of men. . . . If . . . they assert themselves by developing a different kind of strength from that which man has developed, *a moral strength, which still commands universal respect*, they will prove, not their equality, but their superiority . . ."⁶⁹

The one book of a professional sociologist specially devoted to the role of woman, Ernest R. Groves' *The American Woman*, is very disappointing. Aside from a superficial and inaccurate interpretation of religious influence in the life of woman, the author betrays his indebtedness to the waning philosophy of behaviourism. He maintains that science reinforces what sociology has long stressed, "that much that seems to distinguish the man from the woman is cultural in origin and more to be explained by tradition expressed in folkways and *mores* rather than by influences coming from the physiological differences of the male and female . . ."⁷⁰

The consideration of feminine psychological traits would not be complete if we did not consider the conclusions of contemporary social philosophers and theologians as well as those of the psychologists and social scientists. Space permits citation of only a few whom the author has found most significant.

G. K. Chesterton has a provocative essay on "Feminism" in *What's Wrong With the World*. If we are to settle the sex question at all fairly, he says, we must understand two points on which woman, "actually and of herself," is most tenacious: the ideal of thrift and the ideal of dignity. By thrift is not meant a small or timid or provincial thing; "it is part of that great idea of the woman watching on all sides out of all the windows of the soul and being answerable for everything"; a sort of universal vigilance. The female ideal of dignity rests ultimately on a strong idea of spiritual isolation; the same that makes women religious. "They do not like being melted down; they dislike and avoid the mob. Every woman is a captive queen. But every crowd of women is only a harem broken loose."⁷¹ "Much of what is called her

⁶⁸Cited by Baber, Ray E., *Marriage and the Family* (New York: 1939), p. 423.

⁶⁹Baber, *op. cit.*, p. 436 (Italics his).

⁷⁰Groves, Ernest R., *The American Woman: The Feminine Side of a Masculine Civilization* (New York: 1944), pp. 402-403.

⁷¹Chesterton, G. K., *What's Wrong With the World?* (1910) New Edition (New York: 1942), pp. 156-165, *passim*.

subservience, and even her pliability, is merely the subservience and pliability of a universal remedy; she varies as medicines vary, with the disease."⁶² Jacques LeClerq, in his *Marriage and the Family*, makes the following observations on feminine psychology.

Feeling plays a greater role in the woman than in the man. She reasons less and feels more. This is not to say that she is less intelligent: she is intelligent in a different way . . .

Masculine intelligence takes a more comprehensive view of things; the woman views them in their details. Her power of observation is more highly developed than the man's, but her power of synthesis is much less developed than his . . .

A being of feeling, woman is more passionate than man — a fact which explains the marvels of feminine heroism, as well as the refinements of her perverseness. Her life is lived more in the concrete; theory interests her little; the human factor captivates her . . .

. . . She is by nature a particularist.

Accordingly, she gives herself up to love more than a man does. Love takes up the whole of the woman's life; it transcends the simple problem of carnal satisfaction; it completely overruns the psychical sphere . . .

One might say that in the woman the human compound is better unified than in the man; in a way the soul and body appear more closely interdependent. Feminine intelligence is more impregnated with feeling and woman's feeling is more saturated with intelligence. The reaction of physiological alterations on her intelligence is stronger . . .

. . . the woman, living more by feeling and more prone to focus her attention upon details, experiences greater difficulty than the man in orientating her life. Unsited to comprehensive views and general conceptions, she ordinarily feels the need of masculine support in matters of importance. She needs a master who will direct her . . .⁶³

Jacques Maritain, in his sketch on the thoughts of St. Paul, considers the Pauline attitude toward woman, showing the deeper meanings involved.

If the equal dignity in man and woman of the spiritual soul of the human person admits of a profound functional diversity and if in marriage man has primacy with regard to authority (the woman having for her part primacy with regard to love and being well aware of it) it would be completely to distort Saint Paul's views on this subject to find in them I know not what essential difference on an intellectual or moral level, for which reason might be sought in biology and on which it might be desired to establish a sociological rule. Their meaning is a very high metaphysical meaning. They relate to the metaphysical finalities inscribed in nature, and to the fact that womanhood as such is directed toward man, and hence toward love, wherein it finds its fulfilment, whereas the masculine nature as such is directed towards the operation of reason (that is to say, in the

⁶²*Op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁶³Leclercq, Jacques, *Marriage and the Family*, translated by T. R. Hanley, O.S.B.: second edition (New York: 1942), pp. 294-297, *passim*.

supernatural order, toward the Incarnate Word) and hence toward authority over nature, in which it finds its fulfilment . . .⁶⁴

Commenting on the text of St. Luke, "His mother kept all these words in her heart," Gerald Vann, O.P., observes that this text provides a clue to the qualities of both sexes. "If you look at primitive societies where human nature is at its simplest, you find a clear-cut division: the man is the bread-winner, the active one, the builder; the woman is the housewife, the receptive one, the conserver. . . . And as the intellectual life of a community evolves, the same fundamental distinction persists: it is the man, the builder and legislator, who represents reason; the woman, the conserver and consoler, who represents intuition. . . .

"Man . . . tends to be concerned with the immediate and apparent needs of life, with the surface, and in consequence to take the short view; woman is meant by nature to be slower to leap to conclusions; it is for her to keep in her heart the words, the experiences, which life brings to them both; in having kept them in her heart, to come to understand them in a different way. . . ."⁶⁵

In his Encyclical Letter on the Christian Education of Youth, Pope Pius XI refers in a general way to the differences between male and female. He states "there is not in nature itself, *which fashions the two quite different in organism, in temperament, in abilities*, anything to suggest that there can or ought to be promiscuity and much less equality in the training of the two sexes. These in keeping with the wonderful designs of the Creator are destined to complement each other in the family and in society, *precisely because of their differences which therefore ought to be maintained and encouraged* during their years of formation, with the necessary distinction and corresponding separation, according to age and circumstances."⁶⁶

For a final testimony on this matter of the characteristics of the feminine sex, we could do no better than to study the words of the present Holy Father, Pius XII. In a passage referred to in the beginning of this essay, the Pontiff insists that "a man and woman cannot maintain and perfect this equal dignity of theirs, unless by respecting and activating characteristic qualities which nature has given each of them, physical and spiritual qualities which cannot be eliminated, which cannot be reversed without nature itself stepping in to restore the balance. . . . Now the sphere of woman, her manner of life, *her native bent*, is *motherhood*. Every woman is made to be a mother: a mother in the

⁶⁴Maritain, Jacques, *The Living Thoughts of Saint Paul* (New York: 1941), p. 125.

⁶⁵Vann, Gerald, O. P., *Eve and the Gryphon* (Oxford: 1946), pp. 29-30.

⁶⁶"Divini Illius Magistri" (December 31, 1929) cf. *Social Wellsprings*, Vol. II (Milwaukee: 1942), pp. 109-110 (*Italics mine*).

physical meaning of the word or in the more spiritual and exalted but no less real sense. For this purpose the Creator organized the whole characteristic make-up of woman, her organic construction, but even more her spirit, and above all her delicate sensitiveness. . . . But it is clear that if man is by temperament more drawn to deal with external things and public affairs, woman has, generally speaking, *more perspicacity and a finer touch in knowing and solving delicate problems of domestic and family life which is the foundation of all social life. . . .* Associated with men in civil institutions, she will apply herself especially to those matters which call for *tact, delicacy and maternal instinct* rather than administrative rigidity. . . .⁶⁷

In his allocution to the Congress of the International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues, Rome, Italy, September 11, 1947, the same Pontiff speaks of the perils of the heart to which, in our day, woman is particularly exposed. "We are thinking of that *generous tendency* that makes us sympathize with others and share in their sorrows, their joys and their hopes. . . . It is not enough to be good, tender, generous; one must also be wise and strong. . . ."⁶⁸

SUMMARY

It is now necessary to coordinate the observations and conclusions on the psychological characteristics of woman; for it is only in light of certain generalizations on the characterology of woman that sociology will be able to appreciate the proper social roles of the feminine of the human species. After considering the authors cited above, and many others who are not indicated, the writer sought to derive a common denominator of characteristics or psychological tendencies which might provide a basis for further discussion and research in the sociology of the sexes. At the present stage of the research, the general psychological tendencies or traits which seem best to describe the feminine nature are the following three: *to be reserved, to conserve, to serve.*

1) The tendency "to be reserved" involves a certain feminine biological and psychological passivity or receptivity spoken of by the ancients and moderns alike; the more shrinking, more difficult to arouse qualities indicated by Aristotle; the ideal of dignity and isolation, and of purity; reflective intelligence; the deeply internal self-realization; the delicate sensitiveness spoken of by Pius XII.

⁶⁷Pius XII, *Your Destiny is at Stake: Woman's Duties in Social and Political Life*, October 21, 1945 (N.C.C.W., Washington: 1946), *passim*. (Italics mine).

⁶⁸Pius XII, *Papal Directives for the Woman of Today* (N.C.C.W., Washington: 1947), *passim*. (Italics mine).

2) The tendency "to conserve" is exemplified in the basic motherly, protective qualities indicated by almost all writers and especially the present Pontiff; an organic tendency to stability and conservatism; more retentive memory; warm, nourishing passion; the centripetal tendency; the ideal of thrift; patience, self-sacrifice, and domestic prudence, so characteristic of the Valiant Woman.

3) The tendency "to serve" proceeds from the fundamental altero-centrism of woman, aided by some intuitive superiority; compassion and solicitude; a particularism involving adaptability and pliability; perspicacity and a finer touch in dealing with personal problems; the fundamental orientation toward man, and hence toward love.⁶⁰

<i>To be reserved</i>	<i>To conserve</i>	<i>To serve</i>
More shrinking, more difficult to rouse to action (Aristotle)	More retentive memory (Aristotle)	More compassionate (Aristotle)
Reflective intelligence (Marholm)	Nourishing passion (Marholm)	Solicitude (Marholm)
More affectable (Ellis)	Inward creative powers (Key)	Tactfulness (Ellis)
Passive self-dependence (Mayreder)	Conservative or centripetal tendency (Mayreder)	Alterocentrism (Lombroso)
Personality and charm (Lombroso)		Intuitiveness (Lombroso)
Receptivity (Menninger)	Centripetal character (Farnham)	Adaptability (Menninger)
Passivity (Deutsch)		Intuition (Scheinfeld)
Self-realization, deeply internal (Farnham)	Tenderness (Comte)	More sensitive (Ross)
Purity (Comte)	Guardian of hereditary qualities (Ward)	Particularism (Wieth-Knudsen)
Passive-defensive (Ward)	Faculty of re-production (Wieth-Knudsen)	
Coyness (Westermarck)		
Ideal of dignity (Chesterton)	Ideal of thrift (Chesterton)	Pliability (Chesterton)
Receptive (Vann)	More passionate (Leclercq)	Power of observation (Leclercq)
	Conserver (Vann)	
	Motherhood (Pius XII)	
		Orientation toward man (Maritain)
		Perspicacity and finer touch (Pius XII)

Obviously these are generalizations and approximations which admit of many exceptions and perhaps some misinterpretations, if not under-

⁶⁰The following chart attempts to classify some of the many characteristics listed by the authors cited above. While not exhaustive, and although somewhat arbitrary, it may help to focus discussion on specific points rather than resounding generalities.

stood in light of the principles laid down at the beginning of this essay. Whatever their limitations, they do crystallize at least for the writer the feminine psychological characteristics which our modern world should seek to understand and develop, rather than to thwart, repress, or divert through ignorance or malice. The test of a society's culture in relation to the feminine sex might well be put in these questions: Does the prevailing culture afford woman suitable and adequate opportunities for privacy, to be modest and reserved? Does it provide worthwhile goods and values for her to conserve? Are its areas of service satisfying to the innermost alterocentrism of feminine love?

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Catholics in the 80th Congress

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EIGHTY-TWO Senators and Representatives in the 80th Congress claim membership in the Catholic Church. A survey conducted by the Washington bureau of *Newsweek* and published by that magazine in its issue of Aug. 7, 1947, tells us this fact. Since the poll was confidential in nature, no information derived by it could be made available to us. But, by consultation of the *Congressional Directory* and *Who's Who in America* and from private information and inquiry, we were able to gather the names of eleven Senators and sixty-seven Representatives who are Catholics. This total is only four less than that given by *Newsweek* and includes only two or three whose status in the Church could be doubted. The data presented in this article is limited to these Sixty-seven Representatives.¹

Catholics, then, make up 11.5 percent of the members of the Senate and 15.4 percent of the members of the House of Representatives. This is not up to the ratio of Catholics in the total population which is estimated at about 18 percent. Moreover, this is less than half the proportion that Catholics bear to the total church membership in the United States. Of the estimated 73,000,000 church members, some 25,000,000 — or about 34 percent — are Catholics.

By party affiliation, forty-one of our sixty-seven are Democrats, twenty-five are Republicans and one is a member of the American Labor Party of New York. Thus, 62 percent of the Catholic Representatives are Democrats, a decrease from the ratio that prevailed in the 79th Congress where 87.5 percent of the seventy-seven Catholics of our previous survey were Democrats. In the Senate, ten Catholic Senators are Democrats and one is a Republican.

Within the parties themselves, the Catholics number 22 percent of the Democrats and 10 percent of the Republicans in the House. In contrast with the 79th Congress, this represents a loss of five percent in the Catholic strength among the Democrats and doubles the Catholic

¹Cf. "Catholics in the Seventy-ninth Congress," *American Catholic Sociological Review*, December, 1946 (7:259-66). The full implications of the findings of the present article can best be had by comparison with the voting records of the Catholic Congressmen in the Seventy-ninth Congress.

proportion among the Republicans. In the Senate, the Catholic proportion among the Democrat Senators remains about the same, 22 percent.

Turning our attention, now, to the cities from which the Catholic Representatives come, we find that more than half of them live in cities of over 500,000 population. The break-down is given in Table I according to city-sizes.

TABLE I

<i>City-size</i>	<i>Democrats</i>	<i>Republicans</i>	<i>American Labor Party</i>	<i>Total</i>
over 500,000	21	14	1	36
50,000 to 500,000	11	0		11
10,000 to 50,000	5	5		10
less than 10,000	4	6		10
<hr/> Totals	<hr/> 41	<hr/> 25	<hr/> 1	<hr/> 67

To justify a correlation tentatively proposed in 1946, that Catholic Congressmen come from the large cities simply because Catholics live in these cities, we note here the increase in the number of Republicans in the largest, metropolitan-size class. In the 79th Congress, there were two Catholic Representatives from cities of over 500,000 population; in the 80th, there are fourteen. No changes in total occur in the intermediate classes but at the bottom of this scale we find that Catholic Republicans in the smallest class increased from three to six. On the other hand, the reduction of Catholic Democrats from sixty-six to forty-one is mainly the result of the decrease in their large-city representation. From numbering forty in the largest class of cities, Catholic Democrat Congressmen declined to twenty-one.

Catholics in the 80th Congress came from only nineteen States, and the majority of them from the five States of Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania. Each of these have five or more Catholic Representatives in our list and New York itself has nineteen Catholics on its slate of forty-five Representatives. The five large States have a total of thirty-seven Catholic Congressmen. Fourteen other States contribute the remaining thirty.

Let us look now at the voting records of the Catholic Members of Congress. To determine our standard of judgment concerning the progressive or liberal side of domestic issues, we used the "Congressional Supplement" to the *ADA World* for July, 1948, published by Americans for Democratic Action, and the "1948 Voting Record" that was distributed with the *CIO News* of July 19, 1948. Ten issues were chosen from among the CIO's sixteen and the ADA's twelve criteria.

The first seven listed below were common to both tabulations. Only one is related to foreign policy and that indirectly. The last three were selected from the CIO list. We adopted the ADA and CIO designation of "right" and "wrong" or "plus" and "minus" to mean progressive and non-progressive votes.

The ten measures used in this survey are:

1. *The Taft-Hartley Act.* The vote used was the third and decisive ballot taken on June 20, 1947, on over-riding the President's veto. Despite liberal and labor opposition, the House voted, 331 to 83, to over-ride the veto.
2. *The Income Tax Bill.* A substitute for the Knutson bill, offered by Mr. Rayburn of Texas, the minority leader, to increase personal exemptions and impose a corporate excess-profits tax, was defeated by a vote of 159 for this progressive amendment to 258 against it.
3. *Rent Control.* On the question of whether local rent advisory boards, accused of being in control of real estate interests, should control rent ceilings or whether they should be subject to the Housing Expeditor, the House on March 18, 1948, approved the policy of local control by 228 minus votes to 155 plus.
4. *Public Power Plants.* The House Appropriations Committee had eliminated an authorization for a U. S.-owned steam plant at Johnsville, Tenn., to improve TVA's electric power service. A motion to recommit the bill to the Committee to include this item was defeated on May 11, 1948. The vote showed 152 liberals for public power projects and 192 against them.
5. *The Mundt-Nixon Bill,* designed to combat subversive activities, was "complicated, unwise and unconstitutional," according to ADA. It passed the House on May 19, 1948, by a vote of 319 to 58. The smaller group gave plus votes.
6. *Reciprocal Trade Agreements.* The vote here is on Mr. Doughton's motion to amend the bill so as to extend the President's authority three years, instead of one year as proposed in the Republican version. Favored by progressives, the longer extension lost by a vote of 168 to 211 on May 26, 1948.
7. *The Bulwinkle Bill* exempts railroad rates from the anti-trust laws, if the agreements among the railroads fixing the rates are approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In line with his approval of anti-trust prosecution, Mr. Truman vetoed the bill. The House voted to over-ride this veto, on June 17, 1948, 297 to 102. The President's supporters were plus on this item.
8. *The Anti-Poll Tax Bill* proposed to eliminate the poll tax on voting in Federal primaries and elections. Despite Southern opposition, it passed the House on July 21, 1947, 290 to 112, with Republican and progressive support.
9. *Farm Electric Power Loans.* A proposal that \$300,000,000 be added to an appropriations bill to finance REA loans to farm cooperatives for the purchase of added power equipment was defeated by a vote of 151 progressives for the loans to 181 against them, on Feb. 24, 1948.

10. *The repeal of oleo taxes*, favored by progressives, was voted by the House on April 28, 1948. The vote was 260 to remove against 106 to retain the taxes.

On these ten measures, the total vote of the House was 1578 right votes and 2224 wrong votes for a progressive average of 41.3 percent. But, the sixty-seven Catholic members cast 375 progressive ballots against 209 anti-progressive votes for an average of 64.2 percent.

Taking each major party separately, we find that the Democrats polled 1111 plus against 494 minus votes on these ten issues for an average of 69.2 percent right. But the Catholics among them did even better, casting 317 progressive votes against 57 non-progressive ballots for a liberal average of 84.8 percent. There is not so sharp a contrast among the Republicans. The party as a whole scored an average of 21 percent on its 467 plus and 1750 minus votes. The Republican Catholics managed to do somewhat better by voting 58 times right and 152 times wrong on progressive issues for an average of 27.6 percent.

Table II shows the varying percentages of liberal votes among the Catholic Representatives according to the size of their home-cities and their parties.

TABLE II

City-size	Democrats (incl. A.L.P.)				Republicans			
	No.	"Right" Votes	"Wrong" Votes	Progressive Percentage	No.	"Right" Votes	"Wrong" Votes	Progressive Percentage
over 500,00	22	175	23	88.4%	14	39	82	32.2%
50,000 to 500,000	11	78	17	82.1%	0			
10,000 to 50,000	5	35	11	76.1%	5	6	32	15.8%
less than 10,000	4	29	6	82.8%	6	13	38	25.5%
Totals	42	317	57	84.8%	25	58	152	27.6%

One conclusion that might be drawn from a summary like Table II is that Republican Catholics from the largest cities have better voting records as progressives than those from small-size urban areas. But how explain the higher proportion of liberal votes of those from the smallest class over the 10,000 to 50,000 population class? In any case, our sample is too small for valid deductions. Besides, the same phenomenon is noted on the Democratic side.

Let us conclude the consideration of Catholic Congressmen's voting records with some highlights that appeared from this survey. Almost one-half of the fifty-eight Members of the House who voted against the Mundt-Nixon Bill, (twenty-five is the number,) were Catholics.

The thirty-two who voted in favor of the Bill were only one-tenth of the 319 who favored it. On the Taft-Hartley Bill, thirty-four Catholic Representatives voted among the eighty-three who upheld the President's veto; while the thirty Catholics on the wrong side were lost among the 331 who over-rode the President's action. Twenty-four Catholics earned plus votes, along with sixty-four other Members, by supporting Mr. Truman's veto of the Tax Bill as finally passed (not included in our list of ballots) while the thirty-six Catholics on the other side were a small portion of the 311 Representatives who made the Bill a law.

Among the Catholic Senators, perfect records were scored by Senators McGrath of Rhode Island, Murray of Montana and O'Mahoney of Wyoming. Near-perfect progressives were Senators Chavez of New Mexico, McMahon of Connecticut and Myers of Pennsylvania. Other Senators' liberal averages were: 70 percent for McCarron of Nevada, 55 percent for Ellender of Louisiana, and 35 percent for O'Connor of Maryland. Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin was wrong on everything except foreign policy in the ADA and CIO view. Senator Wagner of New York did not vote on any of the listed measures but from the recorded "pairs" and his announced views, we gather he would have had a perfect record.

* * *

Again we close our survey by offering no conclusions. We are content to cite *Newsweek's* article of Aug. 7, 1947, which said: "The American people are now choosing their legislators on their records and without particular regard to their faiths." An editorial column in describing the poll, said in part: "Catholics were the most willing to state their faith. In fact, they were apt to add, 'and I'm a good Catholic, too'."

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Observation in the Social Sciences

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I.

Begin
SCIENCE, both natural and social, is a thought system and a system of action. As a system of action, science consists of innumerable efforts aiming either at the establishment of facts, *i. e.*, singled out parts of reality, past or present,¹ or at giving them sense, *i. e.*, arranging them into a thought system. There is only one way of adequately achieving either goal. Facts are established through immediate experience in the two forms of sense perception and introspection, in both cases in the framework of a conceptual scheme: this is observation. They are introduced into the thought system of science through inference, or logical reasoning. In consequence, the edifice of every science is built up entirely on observation and inference from it.

Observation is the only way of access to the facts, statements about which form the very foundation of every science.² But, in the treatises and textbooks on methods in the social sciences, observation is often distinguished from testimonial evidence and evidence contained in historical traces (historical, or documentary evidence).³ Moreover, in the social sciences, the question is debated whether observation can or cannot be supplemented by experiment. These statements seem to imply that there exist other ways of access to the facts than observation. The contradiction is, however, only imaginary because it can be easily demonstrated that testimonial and historical evidence and experiment as ways of access to the facts are merely modalities of observation.

To understand correctly testimonial and historical evidence as modalities of observation, let us distinguish two situations. In some cases the

¹This is a definition at variance with that of T. Parsons: "An empirically verifiable statement about phenomena" (*The Structure of Social Action* [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937], p. 41).

²This is another expression of V. Pareto's fundamental idea that sociology should be a system of logico-experimental theories. *Mind and Society*, English translation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936), Vol. I, Nos. 6, 13, 69 and 71.

³Non-documentary traces of the past (e. g., tools, coins, monuments). In contrast with documentary traces, no former observation is stored in them. They differ from direct observation in that, to understand them, expert knowledge of past sociocultural systems is necessary.

person who wants to know a fact (the inquirer) immediately experiences it; let us call this case direct observation. In other cases the inquirer is not granted this opportunity; but there is another person (the informant) who has experienced it. Without the latter's cooperation, the inquirer is unable to achieve his end. This cooperation is carried out in the form of a statement reproducing the content of the informant's observation as stored in his memory. This statement may be oral or written, carried out in response to the inquirer's request, or independently of the latter's stimulation. If it is carried out at the request of the inquirer, this is testimonial evidence. If it is carried out under other circumstances, so that the inquirer uses a record of statement not addressed to him, this is historical evidence.

These propositions permit an understanding of testimonial and historical evidence as modalities of observation. The inquirer observes verbal conduct of the informant (simultaneous with the inquirer's observation, as in an interview, or preceding it, as in the questionnaire, the biogram* and all kinds of historical evidence). The informant has observed (or asserts to have observed) the fact which the inquirer wants to know, and reproduces his memory traces (or asserts that he is doing so). In consequence, we are in the presence of a chain of observations: the inquirer observes the reproduction of the observation of the informant. The link between the two is a voluntary action of the informant. The significance of this action (and of the whole procedure) depends on the correctness of the initial observation and on the ability and intention of the correct reproduction of the memory traces. To this point we shall return near the end of this paper.

It is noteworthy that complications are possible. The informant may not have observed the fact relevant to the inquirer, but observed the verbal conduct of another person who had observed the fact and reproduced it in a way perceptible to the informant. Then the chain consists of three observations linked by two acts of reproduction. Additional links may be added to the chain, and with their increase in number concrete knowledge of the personal and other conditions of the direct observation may get lost. This is knowledge from hearsay or vague knowledge conveyed through oral tradition (such as existing in some

*"Biogram" This is an excellent term coined by Theodore Abel "The Nature and Use of Diagrams," *American Journal of Sociology*, III (1947), pp. 111-118. It should be commonly adopted as a substitute of the term "life history document" which is often identified with personal records in general. See for instance L. R. Gottshalk, "The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and Sociology," in the *Social Science Research Council Bulletin*, No. 53 (1945), pp. 1-75.

Insert footnote as changed immediately after word evidence

families), or legends, or even gossip.⁵ Despite all these complications, the basic situation remains the same: the real source of information about a fact is its perception by somebody, or one's immediate experience of one's self. This is direct observation. Relating the fact under inquiry, the observation of the inquirer may be called indirect.

There remains the contradistinction between observation and experiment. The line of demarcation between the two is not quite clear. In common opinion, experiment involves the active interference of the inquirer into the facts (i.e. structure of reality) and then observation of the results of interference, whereas, outside the experimental procedure, the inquirer remains passive. But a minority opinion exists attaching the label "experiment" also to such sets of observations in which the subsequent logical reasoning is exactly of the same type as in cases of active interference.⁶ At this place, there is no need of taking sides in the controversy which is a typically verbal one. It suffices to say that, in both opinions, experiment is carried out through observation, or immediate experience of singled out items of reality. In the experiment in the narrower meaning of the term, the effort of observation is preceded by another effort creating an object for observation; in the cases covered by the minority (but not the majority) opinion, the effort of observation is preceded by selection of already existing objects for observation, according to specified rules — but specified rules of selection are commonly used in scientific observation. In consequence, when contrasting observation with experiment, we do not really point to additional ways of access to the facts. Observation outside of the framework of experiment (defined in one or another way) could be called non-experimental observation. This terminology, with experimental observation in place of the abridged term observation, would well underline the unique position of observation in science. *omit*

2.

The objects of observation are facts. In the social sciences (as well as in psychology) two classes of facts are observed, physical and psychic facts, i.e. concrete states of mental processes.⁷

⁵"Current History simply cannot ignore current gossip," says J. T. Shotwell, *An Introduction to the History of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1923), p. 268.

⁶One of the earliest formulations of this view is that by Claude Bernard, in *Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentelle*, 3me édition, Paris, 1912, pp. 14ff. Among recent works see E. Greenwood, *Experimental Sociology* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1945), p. 28, and F. S. Chapin, *Experimental Designs in Sociological Research* (New York: Harper, 1947).

⁷At this place and later on, a terminology as neutral as possible has been used among those offered by the battling schools in psychology.

As physical facts, the positions, the movements and the attributes of material bodies are observed, such as buildings, tools, products of art, products of printing (on the level of perceiving the signs), but also persons behaving or speaking (on the level of perceiving sounds). The observation of such facts is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the collection of the building stones which form the edifice of the social sciences. To achieve this end, we must reach an understanding of social systems, and to do so we must have observed more than physical facts.²⁸ What we need, in addition to the knowledge of physical facts, is knowledge of psychic facts, or of mental processes; in such processes, meanings are ascribed to physical facts, and the correlation of these meanings integrates physical facts into social systems.²⁹

Whereas, relating to physical facts, all modalities of observation can be used, relating to psychic facts this distinction must be made: only the state of the inquirer's own mental process is knowable through direct observation. States of the mental processes of other persons can be observed by the inquirer only through the procedures of testimonial or historical evidence. If the inquirer's end is to know the state of the mental process of A,³⁰ A may become (if he so wishes) his informant. Then, he makes a direct observation of a definite phase of his mental process (self-observation) and conveys the finding to the inquirer; the two observations are present exactly as in the case when the informant conveys to the inquirer the content of his observation concerning physical facts or the states of mental processes of other persons somehow learned by him.

The problem of how does the inquirer understand the information about a concrete state of the mental process of the informant is controversial,³¹ and the particular solutions are relevant in the context of a complete theory of observation. If the theory of inference is correct, then this understanding takes place through inference which comes after observation. If the theories of empathy or intuition are correct, then the meaning of the communication is understood by a mechanism at least partly transcending sense perception, but also different from self-

²⁸"Observation of the behavior of sellers and buyers in a market is not just observation of the movements of physical bodies in space," says F. Kaufman, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 125.

²⁹P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York: American Book Co., 1941), Vol. IV, pp. 40-44.

³⁰This is one of the possible objects of observation in the form of an interview or a questionnaire.

³¹The following discussion of the modes of "understanding" social systems is an adaptation of the excellent treatment of the problem of understanding another's personality by G. Allport in *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York: H. Holt, 1937), pp. 523-48.

observation. This is not the place to make an attempt to solve the controversy. This is however essential: since observation is immediate experience in terms of a conceptual scheme, and since every conceptual scheme used in the social sciences includes a number of well understood meanings relating to actual or virtual states of mental processes, observations are often almost automatically interpreted as identifications of such states,³⁵ though strictly speaking they are not. Despite theoretical doubts,³⁵ the procedure works rather well. One may assert that all the basic propositions of the theoretical social sciences (sociology, political economy, analytical jurisprudence) are based on self-observation and interpretation, intuitive, empathic, or inferential, of observations concerning mental processes of other persons.³⁶ The sociologist, for instance, knows the basic propositions about the social group and the social process before he starts conducting sophisticated investigations of frequency distribution, coefficients of correlation and so on.³⁶ He knows the basic propositions from self-observation concerning his participation in the functioning of social systems, beginning with the family, the play group, the neighborhood group, the primary association, etc. This knowledge gives him material for the construction of a conceptual scheme to be used in the observation of mental processes of men involved operating social systems to which he does not belong.³⁶

3.

Since observation is immediate experience of a singled out part of reality, the result of every observation can be couched in a proposition of a definite type conveniently called "protocol proposition."³⁷ The general form is this: "In place p at time t inquirer N has found $A.B.C.$," where $A.B.C.$ are elements of the conceptual scheme in which the observation has been conducted. These are attributes, or conjunctions of

³⁵Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

³⁶Forming the central theme of the behaviorist approach to mental and social phenomena.

³⁷A. Brecht, "The Myth of Is and Ought," *Harvard Law Review*, LIV (1941), p. 829.

³⁸"The best available description and analysis of the kinship system of the United States is based on material which must come from the kind of common sense and general experience which has been widely held to be of dubious scientific standing," T. Parsons, "The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States," *American Anthropologist*, 45 (1943), p. 22.

³⁹The crude material derived from participant observation of social systems is refined through the common scientific procedure of comparison, classification and generalization. The concepts and propositions thus arrived at are, once more, refined and modified in the course of studies applying sophisticated procedures (statistical or others).

⁴⁰Suggested by O. Neurath, *Erkenntnis*, II-III (1931-32). Quoted by F. Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

attributes;³⁶ whereas the time and space elements of the protocol proposition are explicitly or implicitly included because observation is always oriented towards concrete facts given in time and space.

The operations by means of which an individual protocol proposition is reached depend first, on the content of the conceptual scheme applied in observation, but also on certain variations in the questions to be answered. Among these operations (and, in consequence, the protocol propositions in which their results are couched) these basic classes may be discerned: simple identification, complex identification, comparison, enumeration and measurement.

1. Identification is the assertion of the presence, here and now, of an object, relation, situation, process and so on representing an instance or embodiment of an item contained in the conceptual scheme. In its typical form the proposition reads like this: "X (perceived) is A (an item on the conceptual scheme)", or to the contrary, it is *non-A*. Observing a group of people, a sociologist decides: "This is (or is not) a domestic group; the ties between the members are (or are not) filiation," etc. Observing the conduct of a number of people, an economist decides: "this is (or is not) a free market, or an industrial plant, or a labor conflict." Observing the conduct of other people, a jurist decides: "this is a contract, or a court, or disorderly conduct." In each case a man of science has in his mind a rigid framework (part of the conceptual scheme) which he imposes on the part of reality under observation. If the framework covers that which is being experienced, his decision as to identification is positive; if parts remain uncovered or if, to the contrary, the framework covers more than that which is given in immediate experience, his decision is negative.

2. The operation of multiple identification appears in at least three modalities.

(a) If the concept to be applied for identification is defined as a conjunction of attributes, simple identifications relating to each are necessary, but, in addition to this, the experience of the unity of the objects of the primary identifications; this experience is not present in any one of those which underlie the simple identifications. To assert that X (observed) is a family (item of the conceptual scheme), the sociologist must, first, identify X as a domestic group and, second, as a group of persons tied by marriage or filiation, and ascertain that the two identifications pertain exactly to the same persons. To assert that Y (observed) is a contract the jurist must first identify the actions of the parties as

³⁶Cf. my paper "Definitions in the Social Sciences, *American Journal of Sociology*, LIII (1947), p. 201.

actions of persons legally enabled to bind themselves by obligations; second, identify, in the actions, the concordance of the wills of the parties; and, third, the orientation of the wills towards purposes recognized or protected by the law; and moreover, ascertain that all his identifications cover exactly the same action. In such cases the framework employed is more complex than the one previously studied; when it is being imposed on reality, more than one reading is necessary and, performing the individual readings, the inquirer must be sure not to have moved even slightly his framework. This case of multiple identification is of high importance since the majority of the objects of observation are complex, i.e., are defined by conjunctions of attributes which are assumed to be constant.

Time and again it happens that multiple identification would yield the perception of unity in situations not yet covered by the conceptual scheme used by the inquirer. *E.g.*, the inquirer establishes that the same stratum of society which openly professes high valuation of the continuity of the nation and its culture, has the lowest differential birth rate;³⁰ or that the same culture which holds in low esteem "the truth of faith" gives preference to "visual painting."³¹ This is of high heuristic value, but transcends the level of observation.

(b) Another modality of multiple identification emerges from a possible modification of the p element in our formula of the protocol proposition. Depending on the size of p (which may be a point, but also extend as wide as immediate experience is possible) and the size of the objects under observation (provided that they have extension, or are related to something having extension) experience may identify the presence of more than one X in p , and this may be relevant. For instance, the sociologist observes the presence of "many" people before the building of a consulate of an enemy nation. This is relevant as one of the attributes of the concept of crowd he employs for observation. Or he observes the presence of "many" beds or persons in a room which is relevant when studying housing conditions. The point at issue is this: his observation yields more than a number of consecutive simple identifications. He naturally makes them (e.g., "This is a bed" which, time and again may evoke doubts), but also identifies the co-presence, in space p (defined by the conceptual scheme) of many X 's.

(c) A third modality of complex identification results from a possible modification of the t element in our formula of the protocol proposition. The observation may last more than the infinitesimally short

³⁰G. Myrdal, *Population: A Problem for Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 92-3.

³¹P. A. Sorokin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 682.

period of time necessary for perception, or it may be repeated, at place p ., relating to A, B, C , at time t, t^1, t^2 . The result may be 1) the continuous presence of X ; 2) the continuous absence of X ; 3) the intermittent presence and absence of X , and in the latter case the phases of presence and absence receive definite positions in the irreversible continuum of time, this phase being an earlier and another a later one. Obviously, the operation consists, first, of numerous simple identifications, but they do not cover all that has been observed: The statement " X was first present and then absent" (or the like) reproduces the content of observation not covered by the individual identifications. An economist studying changes in family budgets observes, first, income level A and then income level B . The positions of the findings A and B on the time continuum are highly relevant, and they obviously have been observed in addition to the simple identifications.

3. Somewhat different from multiple identification stands comparison which, on the level of observation, means this: two or more identifications are made, using the same conceptual scheme; then the relevant content of one of these primary observations is so to say mentally superimposed on the relevant content of another observation. This is a procedure well known to everybody familiar with elementary geometry where the theorems on the equality of triangles are demonstrated by the mental imposition of one triangle on another. The results of the imposition may be these: 1) complete identity is observed (which for some reason might have been doubted prior to observation); 2) or a difference is established, one of the identified objects being larger, or smaller in scope, or possessing additional and relevant attributes. Once more, comparison is not reducible to the simple identifications; in addition to them, observation establishes a specific and irreducible relationship between the identified objects.

This may be conducive to the establishment of that in which the compared objects differ. Thus, for instance, a sociologist studies gangs. Using a preliminary conceptual scheme, he identifies many social groups as possible instances of gangs; then he imposes the findings of observation relating group A on those relating groups B, C, \dots, N and establishes that they differ in these points: 1) these consist of three, other ones of four, still other ones of more than four members; 2) in these, differentiation into leaders-followers is conspicuous, in other ones it is not; 3) these indulge in play only, others only in detrimental actions, others in both, and so on.²⁰ On the level of observation he cannot proceed

²⁰The example in text is an adaptation from F. Thrasher's excellent study *The Gang* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1927).

further; logical operations must now intervene. But his observations have yielded results not given in the simple identifications of the individual groups; they have pointed to their variability.

Painstaking comparison is of highest importance when checking the identity of symbol-referent relations in the mental processes of different persons (especially of the inquirer and the informant). The question is whether another person ascribes the same meaning to a symbol as the inquirer does;²² only when, through comparison, identity has been established, is adequate observation of further psychic facts possible. In other cases the question may be relevant whether two or more definitions of the same item of a conceptual scheme are or are not identical. For instance, Roscoe Pound's three meanings of law²³ could be imposed on a specified reality (say, the American), and the identity of the part of reality covered by each checked by means of comparison.

4. Enumeration is somewhat implied in modalities (b) and (c) of multiple identification. In these procedures, these questions naturally arise: how many *X*'s are simultaneously present at *p*; or how many times did *X* recur (or was conspicuous by its absence)? But it can take place independently of multiple identification. The simplest case is that of enumeration in the course of a census. The census-taker makes a series of consecutive identification of "men" possessing definite attributes. However, his protocol proposition (or that of the tabulator) contains one more observed item, namely the statement that fact *X* has recurred *N* times.

5. Measurement is a combination of enumeration with comparison. A unit (standard) is chosen, either implied by the nature of things ("a person" as a unit) or based on convention (a ton, a dollar), or created *ad hoc* (units for measuring attitudes). Each item under observation is compared with the standard, and the number of standards present in the object is enumerated. For instance, the sociologist counts the number of persons forming a crowd, or the amount of dwelling space in cubic feet, or the distribution of time employed by persons under observation among various activities, and so on. The economist quite commonly performs observations of the measurement type, while the jurist rarely needs this type of observation.

A.

As we know, the results of the individual acts of observation are couched in protocol propositions. These form the crude material for the

²²The best technique of verification is experimental or quasi-experimental study of reactions in varying contexts or situations.

²³"Sociology of Law," in G. Gurvitch and W. Moore (editors) *Twentieth Century Sociology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 300.

building up of the edifice of science. A first step toward refinement, concluding the procedure of observation and preceding inference, is the transformation of protocol propositions into singular propositions. The transformation consists of the elimination of the reference to the act of observation. *E.g.*, the protocol proposition "In place *p* at time *t* inquirer *N* has found *A,B,C*" is replaced by the singular proposition "In place *p* at time *t* there was *A,B,C*." The statement is no longer about observation, but about the observed fact, i.e. a singled out item of reality.²⁸

Relating direct observation, the transformation is commonly carried out almost automatically without reflection. "I saw red there and then. *Ergo*, there and then, there was red." This is the type of conclusion based on the tacit acceptance of the general premise: "sense perceptions and self-observations yield correct knowledge of reality." There are, however, well known exceptions and qualifications which must be taken in consideration when operating with the results of direct observation; for instance, one must ascertain the absence of hallucination, delusion, affection of perception, by emotion, bias etc.

Much more complex is the situation relating to testimonial and historical evidence. In addition to the sources of error ingrained in direct observation, both of the informant and the inquirer, sources of error ingrained in the act of the reproduction, by the informant, of his original observation must be taken in consideration, namely: 1) the distortion of the original image in the memory of the informant; then, he is unable to correctly reproduce that which he has observed; and 2) the lack of the intention of the informant to correctly reproduce the traces he possesses in his memory; then, he lies or at least conceals the truth, i.e., his knowledge of reality. *E.g.* (reading a MS) the inquirer observes that Dio Cassius says that Caesar was murdered on the ides of March of the year 710 *Ab Urbe Condita*.²⁹ The transformation of the protocol proposition into the singular proposition "Caesar was murdered on the ides of March" depends on the correctness of the perception of the inquirer (maybe he has wrongly deciphered the MS); 2) the correctness of the observation of the informants of Dio Cassius, and 3) on the inability and willingness to correctly reproduce the traces present in their memory.

It is noteworthy that 1) the distortion of the initial image may invalidate not only testimonial evidence, but also information contained

²⁸To offer everyone the opportunity to check the transformation, the standard of empiric science contains the rule that references to the underlying protocol propositions be attached.

²⁹Dio Cassius Coccianus, *Historia Romana*, book 49, chapter 19. In one of the best contemporary editions (Leipzig: Teubner, 1894), it appears in Vol. II, p. 160.

in historical sources if time has elapsed between the fact observed and its statement in a protocol proposition; 2) this source of error is out of the question if the content of the informant's observation is the state of his own mental process at the time of observation (e.g., in replying to questionnaires on attitudes or opinions).

The procedure of checking the reliability of indirect observation depends 1) on the type of observation used and 2) on the types of possible error. Relating to testimonial evidence in the form of interview, control questions may be used. When the questionnaire or biogram techniques are used, supplementary interaction with the informant is possible. Relating to historical evidence these forms of test are impossible, and this is perhaps the most significant difference between the two modalities of indirect observation.

Relating to the variations of the procedure of verification depending on the probable sources of error these cursory statements can be made. Up to recently men believed in their ability to correctly reproduce what they saw and heard. Even today one is hurt when the correctness of his statement about that which "he saw with his own eyes" is questioned. The advance of psychology has shown that this pretension is unwarranted, and today a whole literature on the character and tempo of the distortion of memory traces exists. On the other hand, since time immemorial men have known that their fellow men are often inclined to distort the truth known to them, and well developed systems of propositions have been constructed by historians, lawyers and psychologists on the conditions under which sincerity of a witness or of the author of an historical document is or is not probable.

The absence of detected errors in the observations of the inquirer and the informant and in the latter's reproduction of his memory traces does not yet warrant the transformation of a protocol proposition into a singular proposition. In addition to the mainly negative procedures mentioned above, positive procedures are used: repeated observation and cumulative observation.

The first is, as just stated, repetition of the observation reported in protocol propositions, all conditions being equal but time. Then the verification receives this form:

(1) In place p , at time t , under conditions P, R, S , inquirer N experienced A, B, C .

(2) In place p , at time t' , under conditions P, R, S , inquirer N experienced A, B, C , Ergo in place p , at time t , there was A, B, C .

This form of verifications usually involves some doubt about the identity of P, R, S . Moreover, it cannot be used if the object of observation is

a unique event. E.g., the informants of Dio Cassius could not have repeated their observations as to Caesar's murder.

The other positive form of verification is the establishment of the identity of protocol propositions stated by two or more persons, relating to the presence or absence, there and then, of specified attributes. The form of verification is then this:

(3) In place *p*, at time *t*, inquirer *N* experienced *A,B,C*.

(4) In place *p*, at time *t*, inquirer *M* experienced *A,B,C*.

Ergo, in place *p*, at time *t*, there was *A,B,C*.

This is the most common form of verification. Obviously, many among the informants of Dio Cassius saw Caesar being murdered. But not always is the same observation simultaneously made by two or more persons, or is there more than one observation couched in terms of a protocol proposition. The historian often finds himself in the position of having only one pertinent observation to rely upon.

It is noteworthy that this form of verification always implies the use of indirect observation in addition to direct observation. Assume that inquirer *N* wants to verify his finding by using the findings of *M*. For him, knowledge of *M*'s observation is always indirect: he directly experiences *M*'s verbal (oral or written) behavior through which the state of the latter's mental process is revealed.

From the structure of the positive procedures of verification warnings against unwarranted transformation of protocol propositions into singular propositions can be derived. Assume that the inquirer uses the first of the procedures, but instead of proposition (2) reaches proposition (5): In place *p*, at time *t*, under conditions *P,R,S*, he has found *A,B*, but not *C*. Or, using the second procedure, he finds, instead of proposition (4), proposition (6): In place *p*, at time *t*, *M* has found *A,B*, but not *C*. Very often, propositions (5) and (6) receive a modified form, such as:

(7) In place *p*, at time *t*, *N* experienced *A,B,K*.

(8) In place *p*, at time *t*, *M* experienced *A,B,L*.

This is relevant, if it is known that *C* and *K*, *C* and *L* are incompatible. Let us for instance assume that the reciprocal conduct of two persons is studied (e.g., in an inquiry of the sociometric type), and *C* means shake-hands, while *K* means a blow.

It is obvious that propositions (5) and (7) invalidate proposition (1) and propositions (6) and (8) invalidate proposition (3). In other words, their transformation into singular propositions becomes impermissible.

There is one more warning against a contemplated transformation. This is the incompatibility of the protocol proposition with expectation

logically derived from an accepted "law," or a statement about uniformity. A conspicuous case is this: observation (in form of enumeration) of female criminality in various countries plus the comparison of their findings yields the result that, in the United States, the sex ratio of criminality is higher than in the major European countries. A law seems however to have been well established according to which, other things being equal, the scope of criminality fluctuates in direct ratio to the number of extra-domestic contacts. Since, for an American woman, the number of such contacts is conspicuously higher than for her European sisters, the finding reported above runs against expectation.

In such cases, either the protocol proposition is invalidated, or the law is undermined. In the case reported, criminologists either suspect the correctness of observations²⁶ or consider that the law correlating the number of contacts and crimes is a wrong generalization.

Applying criteria of the described types, the inquirer transforms his protocol propositions into singular propositions. In many cases he is unable to entirely comply with the standards; e.g., only one observation is available. These are not insuperable obstacles against the formulation of singular propositions. But the standards of empiric science require that the singular proposition be then accompanied by a statement about the degree of its reliability, in other words, about the degree of probability that it correctly states the fact. Such probability statements have obviously nothing to do with probability statements based on the knowledge of frequency distributions.²⁷

With the transformation of verified protocol propositions into singular propositions, the ascription to the latter of degrees of probability (reliability) and the elimination of protocol propositions invalidated in one of the ways reported above, the procedure of observation is terminated. This is obviously not all that empiric science can and must achieve; but this is the indispensable prelude to logical operations which cement the singular propositions found through observation into a mental construct called a scientific discipline. *End*

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²⁶E. g., W. Reckless, *Criminal Behavior* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1940), p. 98.

²⁷Kaufman, *op. cit.*, pp. 104ff.

The Verbal Interpretation of Social Documents

PAUL HANLY FURFEY

VERBAL interpretation means the systematic discovery of the literal sense of recorded language. The *literal sense* is the meaning which follows naturally from the words themselves, taken singly and in groups. The term *social document* is understood broadly in the present paper. It refers to any recorded language of interest to social scientists. It may consist of written language in the form of handwriting, typewriting, printing or any other type of mechanical reproduction or it may consist of spoken language recorded on a phonograph record, steel tape, or wire. Unrecorded interviews, photographs, motion-picture films, and various sorts of objects may be of interest to the social scientist and may need interpretation; but in the present paper they are excluded by definition from the category of social documents.

It should be clear that verbal interpretation is not the only type of interpretation of which documents stand in need. For example, even when the literal sense of a passage has been established beyond a doubt, the question may yet be raised whether the author is speaking in all seriousness or ironically, whether he is recording a historical fact or spinning a tale, whether he is speaking metaphorically or literally, and so on. Even if one masters completely the whole literal sense of what Plato had to say in his *Republic* on the proposed communism of wives and children, one may still wonder what the great philosopher had in mind. Was he proposing the system as a feasible ideal or was he merely composing a sort of myth to illustrate valid principles? Again, when a writer claims to report certain objective facts, we may yet question how accurate he is and how worthy of credence. Obviously enough, verbal interpretation takes us only to a certain point in the interpretation of social documents; beyond that point other forms of interpretation must take up the task.

If verbal interpretation cannot tell the whole story, it nevertheless remains true that the technique has a basic importance and underlies all other forms. Before one can decide whether an author is to be understood literally or metaphorically one must first know what he is saying. Before attempting to decide whether a life-history document is credible

or not one must first understand its content. A scholar with an imperfect knowledge of German could not write a competent paper on the sociology of Othmar Spann and the reason is that he would be unable to grasp sufficiently the literal sense of the writer. Verbal interpretation lays the foundation upon which other types of interpretation build and the completed structure can be no firmer than its foundation.

To apply the techniques of verbal interpretation efficiently one must have before oneself the words of the original in the form in which they were actually expressed. In this respect sound recordings offer a great advantage. The wire of a wire recorder does not lie or make mistakes. Usually, however, we work with written documents and these often involve the possibility of error. Before the invention of printing copyists made mistakes which could easily be multiplied with successive copyings. Typographical errors creep into printed books in spite of the author's vigilance and new editions sometimes mean new errors. Editors sometimes take liberties with a text; in trying to correct mistakes they may merely succeed in distorting the original. The history of ancient texts is full of illustrations of this. Although this topic belongs more properly to textual criticism than to verbal interpretation its importance merits a few remarks at this point.

When dealing with works published since the invention of printing it is important to select the correct edition. Ordinarily this will be the last edition published during the author's lifetime and thus subject to his corrections. For example, Malthus' work *An Essay on the Principle of Population as it affects the Future Improvement of Society* passed through six editions during his lifetime, all of which involved considerable changes. Clearly, the last edition which he revised should be taken as the definitive expression of his thought. Anyone who criticizes a work, only to find that the author has revised his views in a later edition, exposes himself to ridicule.

It is a particularly reprehensible practice to interpret an author's thought from a quotation made by some third person. Thus, for example, one might seek to understand Comte's views on some matter, not from Comte's own writings, but from a quotation which another writer had taken from Comte. Not only is such a quotation separated from its context, but it may be very inaccurate. Experience shows that authors are often exceedingly careless in quoting from others and not infrequently quotations are very badly garbled.

Works published before the invention of printing offer a more difficult problem because in these cases the originals have usually perished and existing manuscript copies usually differ more or less among themselves. The problem of restoring the original text as well as possible

belongs to textual criticism which is an exceedingly technical and difficult art. It is unreasonable to demand that every sociologist who discusses the social thought of ancient and medieval writers should master this art; but two things can rightly be expected. First, every such writer should be sure to use the best existing critical edition, the edition preferred by competent experts in the field. Secondly, he should clearly specify the edition he is using so that others can control his work. He should know, for instance, that Migne's huge patrologies have been superseded in many cases by later and more critical editions and he should use the latter. He should know that the Leonine edition is the preferred edition for those of St. Thomas' works which it includes. In using critical editions he should take into account the variant readings that are usually given at the foot of the page. From them he can learn whether the readings of the text are certain or doubtful and he can take into account the different possible interpretations which the variants offer. These are elementary rules of scholarship and whoever neglects them is without excuse.

Verbal interpretation presupposes another very elementary rule of scholarship which ought to be perfectly obvious, but apparently is not, since it is so frequently neglected. This is the rule that such interpretation must be based on the text in its original language, not on a translation. Translations are often published by incompetent or careless persons and contain errors, omissions, and additions which pervert the meaning of the original. Even the most scholarly and expert translation, moreover, is a very poor substitute for the original text and can never be used as a basis for serious work. An obvious corollary is that no one is entitled to discuss the sense of a passage whose original language he does not control. One of the minimum requirements for the serious discussion of New Testament social thought is a knowledge of first-century Greek. To discuss the Old Testament one needs, among other things, a good knowledge of Greek and Hebrew. A mastery of medieval Latin is essential for the study of St. Thomas. One may, indeed, legitimately use secondary sources to discuss in a general way the thought of an author who wrote in an unfamiliar language. This, however, is not verbal interpretation; it is no more than a reworking at second hand of the verbal interpretations of others. A first-class scholar may do this occasionally, but it is not first-class scholarship.

Verbal interpretation proper involves two processes, the discovery of the meaning of individual words and the discovery of the meaning of words connected in groups. The first process is a matter of vocabulary; the second, of grammar. It is convenient to consider the question of vocabulary separately as it affects respectively living and dead languages.

In living languages the problem may be approached in four stages: (1) the discovery of the word's general meaning within the language, (2) the discovery of its technical meaning within sociology, (3) the discovery of its special meaning within a given school of sociology, and (4) the discovery of some meaning peculiar to a given author. Of course not all these processes need be used in regard to every word an author uses; but all of them are necessary on appropriate occasions.

Dictionaries are, of course, the ordinary means for discovering a word's general meaning within a language. The scholar should not rely on small school dictionaries, but on large and more serious works. Thus we have, for English, *Webster's New International Dictionary* (2nd ed., unabridged, Springfield, Mass.: Merriam, 1934), James A. H. Murray, *New English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (12 vols. and supplement, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), often called "The Oxford English Dictionary," and James A. H. Murray, *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (2 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933). A particular advantage of the Oxford dictionaries is that they give data on the history of words and their meanings. Thus, for instance, one may learn from the smaller dictionary that the first occurrence of the word "sociology" in English was in 1843 and in the larger dictionary one may find a reference to the page of *Blackwood's Magazine* where the word was first used. Special dictionaries may now and then be useful for documents written in Substandard English. An example is, Eric Partridge, *A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English* (2nd ed., New York: Macmillan, 1938) which covers British usage. For serious work in modern foreign languages the student should use dictionaries of the quality represented, for example by the following: J. E. Mansion, *Heath's Standard French and English Dictionary* (New York: Heath, 1934) or Alfred Hoare, *An Italian Dictionary* (2nd ed., Cambridge: University Press, 1925). It is often more satisfactory to use dictionaries written entirely in the foreign language. The largest and most important dictionaries of a given language are generally in this category.

As aids to the discovery of the technical meaning of a word within sociology various special dictionaries are available. Probably the best of these is, Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Dictionary of Sociology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), a work with which every sociologist is familiar. There are two smaller works which have the advantage of not only giving the definition in the author's own words but also of quoting parallel definitions from other sociologists with exact references, namely, Constantine Panunzio, *A Student's Dictionary of Sociological Terms* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1937) and

the "Dictionary of Terms" in Edward B. Reuter, *Handbook of Sociology* (New York: Dryden, 1941), pp. 75-170. Panunzio gives parallel definitions for all of his terms and Reuter, for the more important ones. Another useful book, though not in dictionary form, is E. E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology* (New York: Heath, 1932). Sometimes elementary textbooks carry glossaries; this is the case, for instance, with, Verne Wright and Manuel C. Elmer, *General Sociology* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), pp. 627-31 and, Kimball Young, *Sociology* (New York: American Book Company, 1942), pp. 967-76. Such glossaries are insufficient, by themselves, for serious work, but they can offer valuable confirmatory evidence. Longer articles explaining the meaning of some sociological terms are to be found in, A. R. A. Seligman, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (15 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1930-35).

There is nothing in foreign languages quite equivalent to the American sociological dictionaries. Alfred Vierkandt, *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1931) is an encyclopedia rather than a dictionary; it contains rather long articles on rather few topics. Ludwig Elster and Others, *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften* (4th ed., 8 vols. and supplement, Jena: Fischer, 1923-29) covers a field wider than sociology, as the name implies. G. Jacquemet, *Dictionnaire de sociologie, familiale, politique, economique, spirituelle, generale* (vols. 1-, Paris: Letouzey, 1931-, incomplete) is encyclopaedic in character and defines sociology much more broadly than is customary in this country; it has, however, the advantage that it considers the subject from the Catholic standpoint.

Special schools of sociology quite usually develop a vocabulary of their own and frequently common terms acquire a special meaning for the members of the school. These special meanings are often not given in general sociological dictionaries. Adherents of these schools seldom bother to publish special glossaries for the guidance of outsiders, although Otto Neurath in his *Foundations of the Social Sciences* (International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, no. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944) does something akin to this for the Logical Positivists when he gives a list of words and phrases used and avoided in his monograph (See p. 51 of this work) with page references to his discussions of them. By studying the list one may acquire an elementary knowledge of the special phraseology of this group. For the most part, however, there is only one way to master the vocabulary peculiar to a given sociological school. That is to read extensively in the literature which the school has produced. One should be warned of the danger of trying to interpret an isolated book or article representing

a particular and specialized school of sociological thought. To do so is to expose oneself to the danger of missing the meaning of those terms which are used within the school in a special sense.

Individual sociologists also frequently develop a particular vocabulary of their own. Everyone has heard of Durkheim's *représentation collective*, Giddings' *consciousness of kind*, and Cooley's *looking-glass self*. Phrases as famous as these have passed into the general vocabulary of sociology and may often be found in sociological dictionaries and glossaries. Less well-known terms, however, must be sought in the writings of the author's concerned. Thus if one should happen to be interested in the meanings which Stuart Carter Dodd attaches to such words and phrases as "sector," "indicator," "durating," "respatiating," or "nullary process," one has no alternative but to seek them in his writings, specifically, in his *Dimensions of Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1942). It is easy to be irritated by an author who insists on creating his own vocabulary; but whoever wishes to interpret such an author has no alternative but to master it.

The problem of finding the meaning of words in social documents written in dead languages is not essentially different from the same problem in the case of living languages; yet it has enough special features to deserve separate discussion. Once again, general dictionaries are of basic importance. The best dictionaries give citations to illustrate the various meanings. This is the case, for example, in, Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Revised ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, published in fascicles, 1925-40). By the use of these citations it is possible to trace the various meanings attached to a word in the different periods of Greek literature. Special dictionaries for the vocabulary of social thought in the ancient languages do not exist; but other types of special dictionaries are often of use to the scholar. For example, in the study of the social thought of the New Testament, Gerhard Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (Vols. 1-, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1933-, incomplete) is invaluable. This monumental work illustrates how far the semantic analysis of words may be carried under ideal conditions. Not infrequently, articles on the meanings of individual words run to dozens of quarto pages. Since Kittel's work is still unfinished, one must supplement it, for the missing parts, with such works as Walter Bauer, *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur* (3rd ed., Berlin, Töpelmann, 1937), a work which, as the name implies, considers, not only the New Testament itself, but the Apostolic Fathers and certain other early Christian writings. Roy J. Deferrari and Others, *A Lexicon of St. Thomas*, of which the first

volume is about to be released by the Catholic University Press, should make possible studies of the social thought of St. Thomas on a new level of scholarship.

Many terms significant in social thought are not defined with sufficient accuracy in existing dictionaries. In such instances it may be necessary to institute a special study to determine the meaning of a particular word, as used by a particular author. The most important technique to be used in such semantic studies is the collection of instances of the word's use together with their accompanying contexts. Although the meaning of the word may not be clear from its occurrence in a single context, the comparison of its usage in different contexts is usually sufficient to determine its meaning unequivocally. A semantic study of this sort should cover, not only the usage of the word in the works of the particular author in question, but also its usage by other authors close to him by their backgrounds, their intellectual orientation, or the type of subject matter handled. While thus examining the literature one may come across discussions of a word's meaning, or even a formal definition. These are very helpful, but they do not necessarily settle the question. One writer may not accept another writer's definition or he may even be inconsistent in using a term which he has himself defined. There is no substitute for a painstaking study of all the relevant occurrences of a word. For some authors or groups of authors there exist works which list all, or at least all the important, words used and give exact references to the passages in which they occur. An example of such a work is, Edgar J. Goodspeed, *Index apologeticus* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1912) which covers the writings of a group of early Christian apologists. Such works are naturally very helpful in the type of study which we have been discussing.

Sometimes it is profitable to try to deepen one's understanding of a word's meaning by gathering information from all available sources about the nature of those things which the word is found to denote. For example, the Latin word *fibula* denotes, among other meanings, a brooch, buckle, or clasp. A mere study of the contexts in which the word is used would probably not add a great deal of specific information; but by studying the examples of ancient Roman *fibulae* described by archaeologists or preserved in archaeological museums one could learn a great deal about what the Romans meant by the word. It is often possible to use a similar method when studying the meanings of terms important in social thought. For instance, it is easy enough to learn from a dictionary that the most usual meaning of the Latin *miles* is "soldier"; but to understand all that the word meant to the Romans it would be necessary to learn a good deal about their army, its organization, its

functions, and the character of its personnel. One would learn, for example, that the *milites* were, not only the soldiers, but also the ordinary policemen and jailers of the Roman state. This makes intelligible the advice which St. John the Baptist gave to the soldiers who came to him, telling them not to "accuse anyone falsely" (Lk. 3:14). Of course the Evangelist used the equivalent Greek word in describing the incident; for he was writing about Roman *milites* in Greek; but the point is the same. These *milites*, like modern policemen, had opportunities to practice extortion by bringing false charges and the Baptist was warning them against the temptation.

The writer may perhaps be allowed to illustrate these techniques by instancing his own study, "Plousios and Cognates in the New Testament," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 5 (1943), pp. 243-63. The problem was to determine the exact meaning of the Greek word usually translated "rich." It was found that in the classical literature the meaning of the Greek word differed from the English word "rich" particularly in two respects. First, the Greeks had a twofold economic division of society whereas we have a threefold one; they thought of the rich and the poor whereas we think of the rich, the poor, and a large intermediate class separate from either category. Secondly, while our classification is based primarily on the amount of a man's wealth or income, the Greeks regarded rather the way the wealth or income was acquired; the essential mark of the upper economic class was the ability to support oneself without working with one's hands and from this class were excluded even persons like artists or physicians whose profession involved some amount of manual activity. The word with its cognates occurs 68 times in the New Testament and among these it occurs 34 times in a literal sense. These 34 occurrences were studied to determine what manner of men the New Testament "rich" were. Both their psychological characteristics and the economic basis of their wealth were studied and checked against texts from the profane literature, particularly the profane literature of the first century. In the course of the study it was necessary to examine with some care the contemporary economic system of the Graeco-Roman world. It was found that the New Testament rich were commercial farmers, *rentiers*, publicans, merchants engaged in inter-regional trade, and, probably, bankers. Psychologically, they were characterized by a tendency to overvalue money, by pride, by luxurious living, by a forgetfulness about the brevity of life, and by an often rather ostentatious almsgiving. All these characteristics tallied rather closely with the reports of contemporary profane authors. The general conclusion was that the Greek word ordinarily translated "rich" is actually somewhat nearer in meaning to our word "bourgeois." The

word designates, not so much a man with much wealth or a large income, as a man who by his status is committed almost inevitably to a concentrated attention on the acquisition of money. In the light of these facts it is not hard to understand the severe judgments which Our Lord passed upon the "rich."

Verbal interpretation involves, not only the discovery of the meaning of words taken singly, but also the discovery of the meaning of words in groups; that is, it involves the application of the rules of grammar to reveal the sense of phrases and sentences. It is now time to add something about this latter topic. It may be taken for granted that the scholar has mastered thoroughly the grammar of his native language; yet even here a certain amount of care is necessary. Sometimes a sentence carelessly read will yield one sense; yet when it is reread more slowly and with greater attention the relation of the words and phrases is seen to be different and a new sense emerges. Sometimes careless writing results in obscure passages whose meaning is not always clear even after attentive study.

The interpretation of texts in foreign languages demands a thorough knowledge of their grammar. Even one who is confident of his knowledge of a foreign language does well if he systematically reviews its grammar occasionally. It is easy to overlook the significance of an unexpected subjunctive or to mistake the tense of an irregular verb. It is true that a moderate knowledge of a foreign language broadens one's intellectual horizon, but for serious interpretative work a rather expert knowledge is needed. Even the proficient scholar does well to consult a native speaker when he has difficulty in the interpretation of an obscure passage.

To work competently in a foreign language it is not enough to know the language's grammar in general; one must know the grammar characteristic of the particular period in which the text being studied was written. One might have an expert knowledge of the Attic Greek of Plato and Demosthenes and yet miss many fine points in the Greek of the New Testament written some four centuries later. The latter was written in a variety of *koiné* Greek which has its own characteristics. To understand its grammar one would do well to familiarize oneself with some such work as Friedrich Blass and Albert Debrunner, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (6th ed., Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1931). Expertness in the Latin of Cicero does not necessarily qualify one to interpret the language of the fathers of the fourth century. A good grammar of Patristic Latin is still a desideratum, but one may learn much by studying the grammatical notes in such a work as Martin R. P. McGuire's edition of *S. Ambrosii De Nabuthae*

(Washington: Catholic University, 1927). Proper standards of research scholarship demand meticulous attention to the grammatical usages of particular periods.

It is an instructive exercise to compare different translations of the same passages and, when they differ, to try to account for the differences. It will often be found that the inferior translation perverts the sense of the original because some rule of grammar has been overlooked. An example is the translation of Acts, 2:45. The Authorized Version, an out-of-date translation, renders it as follows: "And sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all *men*, as every man had need." The reference is to the early Christians at Jerusalem and this translation gives the impression that they renounced the right of private property once and for all and universally. It overlooks, however, the force of the tense of the first two verbs, translating them as though they were aorists, whereas they are actually imperfects, specifically iterative imperfects. On this see Blass-Debrunner, section 325. More recent translations give the correct sense. Thus the Westminster Version reads: "They used to sell their property and goods and distribute the price among all" and the Confraternity version gives: "And would sell their possessions and goods and distribute them among all." These imply correctly that the practice was merely characteristic of the group without necessarily being universal. Other passages from the Acts show that the practice was indeed not universal. Some members of the community at Jerusalem continued to hold private property. One sees how a lack of attention to grammatical principles may easily lead to false interpretations.

The general conclusion of this paper is that sociologists would do well to take a more sophisticated attitude toward the problems of verbal interpretation. There is certainly room for improvement here. It happens too frequently that sociologists quote texts incorrectly at second hand, rely on inferior translations without checking them against the original, fail to be careful in following down the exact significance of a word, or attempt a translation without a proper knowledge of the grammar of the foreign language. Perhaps fundamentally it is another instance of the specialist wandering into a field other than his own, with unfortunate results. Classical scholars, for example, are trained from the beginning in the principles of verbal interpretations. The training of the sociologist, however, is usually in a very different field and when he attempts verbal interpretation he does so without an adequate realization of the difficulties involved or of the proper techniques for overcoming them. The remedy, of course, is obvious. All sociologists should have at least an elementary introduction to the principles of verbal interpretation and

those who intend to specialize in the interpretation of social documents should be thoroughly grounded in the subject.

Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

NEWS OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTEREST

In an effort to stimulate research and to pool the efforts of Catholic sociologists in various fields, the American Catholic Sociological Society has set up the following committees:

Academic Sociology: Sister M. Li-guori, B.V.M., Mundelein College, chairman.

Sociology of Law and Knowledge, Political Sociology, and Economic Sociology: Friedrich Baerwald, Fordham University, chairman.

Industrial Sociology: Rev. J. L. Ker-ins, C.Ss.R., chairman.

Community: C. U. Nuesse, Catholic University of America, chairman.

Sociology of Religion (Including the Parish): Rev. Joseph Fighter, S.J., Loyola University (New Orleans), chairman.

Urban Sociology: Sister Leo Marie, O.P., Siena College, chairman.

Social Psychology: James J. Burns, Nazareth College, chairman.

Social Anthropology: Sister M. Inez Hilger, O.S.B., St. Cloud Hospital, chairman.

Family: Alphonse H. Clemens, Cath-olic University of America, chairman.

Rural Sociology: Emerson Hynes, St. John's College, chairman.

Industry Council Plan: Brother Ger-ald J. Schnepf, S.M., St. Louis Univer-sity, chairman.

Educational Sociology (for high-school teachers): Brother Eugene Jan-son, S.M., McBride High School (St. Louis), chairman.

Population: Clement S. Mihanovich, St. Louis University, chairman.

Social Problems and Social Work: Albert J. McAloon, Juvenile Court, Providence, R. I., chairman.

Catholic Social Principles: Rev. Jo-seph Munier, St. Patrick's Seminary, chairman.

Members of the ACSS who wish to serve on or work with any of the above committees should contact the chair-man of the committee.

Franz Mueller of the College of St. Thomas was elected chairman of the Council of Research Committee Chair-men. James Burns was elected vice-chairmen.

* * *

The ACSS has published an eight-page brochure describing the purpose and activities of the Society. It is for general distribution to sociologists and to potential members of the Society. For copies write to the office of the executive-secretary.

* * *

To assist in the placement of high-school, college and university teachers of sociology, the REVIEW will publish notices of academic vacancies and of teachers available.

Members of the Society wishing to avail themselves of this service are asked to follow the form used by the *Bulletin* of the American Association of University Professors. Address all communications to the editorial offices of the REVIEW.

* * *

The St. Louis chapter of the Amer-ican Catholic Sociological Society has elected the following officers for 1949: *president*, William E. Van Taay, Font-bonne College; *vice-president*, Sister

M. Medulpha, LeClerc College; *treasurer*, Hyginus Peculis, Maryville College; *secretary*, Vincent L. Fox, St. Louis University.

* * *

San Francisco College for Women: Beginning with the academic year 1948-49, sociology has been established as a separate unit of the Department of Social Sciences. Students may now elect sociology as their major field in preparation for social work and nursing education. Allen Spitzer, assistant professor of sociology, will be responsible for the instruction in the new unit. Mr. Spitzer, formerly of Stanford University, is completing his doctoral thesis at that institution. Under the auspices of the College, he is developing a long-range program of field work in cultural anthropology.

* * *

Catholic University: Survey II of the Catholic Opinion Study inaugurated a year ago is now under way. The committee at The Catholic University of America organizing the

study consist of Rev. Bernard G. Mulvaney, C.S.V.; Rev. Thomas J. Harte, C.Ss.R.; and C. J. Nuesse, chairman. In order to obtain a wide variety of Catholic groups for inclusion in the study, an attempt is being made to enlist the cooperation of departments of sociology in all Catholic institutions of higher education. Cooperating departments administer the schedules and may use them in studies of their own on the local level.

Three reports of results on Survey I are now available: (No. 1) "Toward a Catholic Opinion Study: Preliminary Report on Survey I"; (No. 2) "The Rating of Adherence to Moral and Religious Implications of Social Issues Presented in an Opinion Survey"; (No. 3) "Catholic Education as a Factor in Catholic Opinion." The first two are mimeographed; the latter, by Rev. Thomas J. Harte, C.Ss.R., was read to the tenth annual convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society.

C. J. NUESSE

BOOK REVIEWS*

Editor:

EVA J. ROSS, *Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.*

THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND. By Stuart Chase. New York: Harper & Bros., 1948. Pp. xx-311. \$3.

Here is a book which, in all fairness to its author, must be considered on three levels: (1) as a successful attempt to popularize recent findings by social scientists; (2) as an effort to set up an omnibus natural science of social relations; (3) as a defense of a *philosophical* position wherein social science alone provides the answers to important social questions.

(1) Stuart Chase believes that the American public has had meager respect for the research work of social scientists whereas it does appreciate the efforts of natural scientists. He cites "many regrettable examples where accredited social science knowledge was available and not used." The bulk of *The Proper Study of Mankind* is thus a reportorial account, in fascinating prose and minus the usual sociological abracadabra, of the many worthwhile contributions made by social science (e.g., Yale University's cross-cultural index, Mayo's work in labor relations, the Lynd and Warner studies of American communities). Many of Chase's observations reveal a remarkable insight into human relations. Speaking of the new trend in social science, he says:

To the adult mind, the great lesson is not human differences, but *similarities*. Common needs persist in human behavior everywhere. They are the universals which govern *homo sapiens*, from the deepest jungles to traffic-snarled cities. To solve our current problems, generalizations and theories will have to be grounded on principles which govern all societies, the common denominators of human existence.

But I fear that many intelligent laymen will be amused rather than awed to read that we can thank social scientists for these "important universals" about the family:

The principal function of the family is to protect the young.

It remains the most effective mechanism for the care and rearing of children.

Marriages across cultures are always difficult.

Every normal person needs response from his group . . .

The individual shows a deep need in every society for friends of the same sex.

The average layman would not invest one cent or one minute in social science if that is the kind of "knowledge" professional social scientists promise to "discover."

*Members who wish to review books are invited to write to Miss Ross, stating their special fields of interest. Specific books should be asked for, if possible, with full details of title, author, and publisher. These should be of recent publication and within the scope of sociology or a closely allied subject.

(2) Chase tries to tie the many strands of social science together by taking the position that cultural anthropology, social psychology, sociology, economics, and political science are "beginning to merge into a science of man." "The culture concept of the anthropologists and sociologists," says Chase, "is coming to be regarded as the foundation stone of the social sciences." But nowhere does he give an adequate, precise explanation of this "cornerstone concept" but only this vague, unsatisfactory definition: "culture refers to the ways of life which the group follows." His failure to do so mirrors the deeper confusion which is at the heart of contemporary sociology and cultural anthropology over the use of the term *culture*. These days it is a rare textbook in introductory sociology where the term is used univocally throughout. Another one of these "king post" concepts in Chase's social science is *human nature*. Here again, there is no clarity, no precision. Only fog. (See especially page 126, pages 147-49.) How can a science of social relations be built on the sleazy foundation of rubberlike terminology?

(3) The above difficulties are directly traceable to Chase's idolatry of social science and his disdain for philosophy and theology. He says:

If we can help the intelligent layman realize that social science is the last best hope for man's continuing on his evolutionary way, unimpeded by gamma rays, this book will not have been written in vain (p. 5). If war is to go, it is probable that only the scientific method can hasten its going. The diplomats, the philosophers, priests, poets, and sages have not found the answer (p. 273). It (social science knowledge) is not a doctrine, a philosophy, a prophet's message, it is social science, where reasonable proof has been established, and speculation practically eliminated. It is something you can really lean up against (p. 68).

Chase fails to distinguish between science as a method of obtaining knowledge and science as a *certain kind* of knowledge. Most of his "ten characteristics of the scientific method" (pp. 20-22) would be acceptable to the philosopher and theologian as canons of objectivity for their disciplines. Chase *assumes* throughout 331 pages that *his* social science is the only real knowledge about society. Here are a few examples:

Where the scientist accepts facts, the philosopher succeeds in ignoring them (p. 36). In the last twenty-five years it is probable that more dependable knowledge has been acquired about human behavior and human relations than in all previous history (p. 284) . . . social scientists have recently forsaken authority, intuition, and pure logic for the harder road of observation.

In speaking of the Kinsey report he says that Kinsey "has immortalized himself by documenting a whole new department in the science of man. He has not said the last word about sex but he has produced the first real data." If Chase meant by real data, scientific data as one kind of knowledge, I would not object. But he implies that the Kinsey report is our first real knowledge about sex! Or does he mean that millions of people are learning about sex for the first time through the Kinsey report?

Chase, I think, has epistemological troubles. He seems to hold that knowledge results only from reason digesting what is revealed by one sort of experience, scientific. Comte made the same mistake a century

ago in his *Positive Philosophy*. Science should not be distinguished from philosophy by saying that science is inductive and empirical. Both science and philosophy are inductive and deductive, and based upon experience. Philosophy is based upon *common experiences* (the whole set of experiences which men naturally have through the ordinary operations of their senses, their memories, and imaginations.) Science¹ is based upon *special experience* (the result of deliberate research and specially contrived inquisitive efforts.) No one speaks of the data of philosophy because the experience upon which philosophy rests is the common experience of all men.

It should be clear that Chase has a legitimate complaint against many theologians and philosophers. In the last half of the 19th century much of the bitter controversy over evolution was prompted by certain theologians who tried to give theological answers to scientific questions (and by certain scientists who tried to give scientific answers to theological problems). A wise man would second Mr. Chase's complaint against the quack theologians and pseudo-scientists who today give platform orations explaining how atomic discoveries have proved the existence of God. Actually, Chase's argument is not with philosophy but with a certain specimen of philosopher. But if Chase picks the worst of the philosophical breed to criticize, he, like Read Bain of Reed College, is fighting straw men.

Chase's infatuation with "science" leads him to what I would call scientific fascism. He quotes approvingly George Lundberg's statement:

It may be that through properly administered public opinion polls professionalized public officials can give us all the efficiency now claimed by authoritarian centralized administrators, and yet have the administration at all times subject to the dictates of a more delicate barometer of the people's will than is provided by all the technologically obsolete paraphernalia of traditional democratic processes.

Does Chase want our congressmen to vote on the basis of a "scientific poll" of their constituents? Does he advocate the abolition of referenda and the hiring of public opinion specialists to take samples?

One final thing about the manner in which this book was written. Before writing the book Chase interviewed, sent a questionnaire to, corresponded with 72 top men whose names read like the "who's who" in social science. These men gave Chase much of his data, "helped forge" his ideas, and kept him, he says, "from straying too far from the main line of inquiry." If we keep these facts in mind, we will not neglect to remember that while this book expresses Chase's own views, there are many others on the same team.

EDWARD A. MARCINIAK

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¹I am not suggesting that the term "science" is used univocally in the expressions "natural science" and "social science". That is another problem.

THE PRESENT STATE OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY. By Edward Shils. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1948. Pp. 64. \$0.75.

Edward Shils is an Associate Professor of the University of Chicago now serving as a Reader in Sociology at the London School of Economics. His booklet, based on his impressions on the whole of American sociology, is an "assessment of the achievements and shortcomings." Omitted from its scope are "areas of research where the European level of achievement is already very high, and where the organs of scientific communication are adequate, e.g. in demography." "The books and articles mentioned were chosen because it was thought that they represented some significant aspect of American sociology, or because they were illustrative of some promising development or some characteristic deficiency" (p. 1). Sketched, then, are the fields of urban, class stratification, ethnic groups, family, communication, religion, the small group and "undeveloped areas."

The "major vice" and "distinguishing virtue" of American sociology are depicted as respectively a lack of an adequate framework for controlled observation and an "eagerness for precision in first-hand observation." The explanation of the "major vice" is illustrated in many fields, and the author is concerned that it has left us "in our present state of backwardness." Anyone who has attended post-war sociology conventions would agree to the statement that conceptualization is needed and a matter of grave concern. In explaining the deficiency, however, Shils seems to be unduly severe regarding the theories of Ward, Giddings and Znaniecki on the one hand, and unduly negligent regarding the direction given research by national sociology societies on the other. The American Catholic Sociological Society is not mentioned. Still, Shils concludes as follows:

"To achieve the dignity of science involves not only an appreciation of and skill in the use of techniques of accurate observation, recording and codification, it requires also a sense of what is important. It requires a moral and political philosophy as a guide in the selection of problems." (p. 64).

B. G. MULVANEY, C.S.V.

*Catholic University of America,
Washington 17, D. C.*

ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY. Presented to George H. Sabine. Edited by Milton R. Konvitz and Arthur E. Murphy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1948. Pp. x-333. \$4.00.

This collection of essays presented to Professor Sabine, author of the well-known *History of Political Theory*, by colleagues and former students upon his retirement after forty-one years of teaching, ranges in subject matter from Athenian democracy in the age of Cleisthenes to modern democracy and Sabine's own philosophy.

In three essays Professors Morrow, Wormuth, and Fisch present studies of Plato's conception of the law of nature, Aristotle's philosophy of law, and Vico's view of Roman law. Morrow shows how the originally antithetical conceptions of "nomos" and "physis" came together in the Stoic conception of "natural law" through the preparatory work

of Plato who saw in "right reason" a guiding principle of law, broadened the idea of "nature" to enable him to speak of human moral action as "according to nature," and extended the idea of "law" to include the relations between the ancient city-states and to make metics and foreign visitors "sharers in the law." Wormuth takes issue with the opinion that Aristotle's ideas of *natural justice* (*Ethics* V, 7) and universal law (*Rhetoric* I, 15, 3-6) "were intended to establish a Thomistic jurisprudence with natural law at its apex," and warns that "it is not safe to build a jurisprudence on the basis of a few sentences in the *Rhetoric*" (p. 58). In saying this, Wormuth is perhaps doing less than justice to both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, for although Aristotle's conceptions of universal law, natural justice, and equity are not fully identical with those of Thomas Aquinas (Thomas was a Christian philosopher, Aristotle was not), it is hard to see why Thomas should refuse the help he could get from Aristotle in developing a distinctively Christian philosophy of law. We must not read Thomistic ideas back into Aristotle, but neither is there any necessity for minimizing the common acceptance by both of an objective moral order of justice and equity superior to shifting opinion and changing legal codes and customs, which is one of the significant ingredients of the natural law philosophy.

In a highly interesting essay, "Mr. Northrop and Mr. Locke," Professor Murphy practices some incisive criticism on Northrop's distorting interpretation of Locke's philosophy in his recent and widely read *Meeting of East and West*, remarking judiciously that while it is no doubt true that men of Locke's age lacked much of the knowledge we possess today, "it may equally be the case that he (Locke) was in a position to see clearly much that his critics, in the confused sophistication of their contemporary anxieties and enthusiasms, are no longer able so justly to discern" (p. 90). Professor Murphy shows clearly that Locke's social philosophy was based not on his theory of unknowable mental substances as Northrop understands him, but "on the equal right that men have under the law of God and right reason, a law which governments are obligated in moral right and justice, not mechanism nor yet epistemology, to respect" (p. 100). Yet neither Professor Northrop nor his critic seem to be aware of the extent to which Locke himself was indebted to Richard Hooker's *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, and through Hooker to Thomas Aquinas whom Hooker quotes repeatedly and at great length, for his social and political philosophy. One could wish that this aspect of Locke's philosophy were given the attention it deserves.

One of the lesser known figures who was for a time associated with Marx in Paris was the "social-tailor" Wilhelm Weitling who came to the United States, and after an unsuccessful experiment with a communist colony in Iowa, died in New York in 1871. Carl Wittke contributes an illuminating study of this communist who broke with Marx because he believed the Marxian remedy worse than the disease it tried to cure.

There are further essays on John Morley, Croce's historicism, and Moeller van den Bruck's book *Das Dritte Reich* (The Third Reich), which was influential in shaping Nazi ideology. Two essays by Julius

Weinberg and Frederick Will deal somewhat critically with Professor Sabine's own philosophy of democracy and values which is strongly under the influence of Hume. In his essay *Reason, Morality, and Democracy* Professor Watts Cunningham, after criticizing various irrationalist political ideologies, concludes by evoking once again (for the edification of all misguided believers in "absolute truth" and "absolute principles") the horrifying spectacle of "the hounds of the Lord" and "the bloody days of the Inquisition," as though the identity between these two (the believers and the "hounds") were well-nigh axiomatic (cf. p. 296f.). In the last essay Robert Cushman analyses some judicial cases involving freedom of speech. The volume concludes with a bibliography of Professor Sabine's books and articles.

ERNEST KILZER, O.S.B.

St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn.

THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO. Translated from the third edition (1744) by Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1948. Pp. xv-398. \$5.00.

When the first complete English translation of Vico's *Autobiography* appeared in 1944 (Cornell University Press), the translators promised also an English version of Vico's *Scienza Nuova*, which they have now presented to the public. Their translation of the *Autobiography* is preceded by a lengthy introductory study of Vico's background, ideas, reputation, and influence, which is meant to serve also for the present translation of the *Scienza Nuova*.

This work is an attempt to trace the origins of society and civilization, and to discover cycles, recurrences, and "laws" of historical development from a study of language, literature, laws, and customs. Vico described his plan and purpose in a synopsis which he prefixed to the first edition of his book: "a Science concerning the nature [i. e. genesis] of the nations, from which [nature] has issued their humanity [i. e. civilization], which in every case began with religion and was completed by sciences, disciplines, and arts . . ." (*Autobiography*, Introduction, p. 49).

To make the reader's task easier the translators broke up Vico's long sentences and paragraphs, modernized the punctuation, and numbered the paragraphs to facilitate reference from the index of names which they have added. In view of the widespread influence which the reading of Vico has had on writers in the different fields of the social sciences, history, philology, law, philosophy, and even literature, including Montesquieu, Rousseau, Herder, Kant, Coleridge, and many others (James Joyce's *Ulysses* and *Finnegan's Wake* show traces of Vico!), the translators have done a great service in making his most important works accessible in the English language.

ERNEST KILZER, O.S.B.

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PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE. Edited by Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. Pp. xxi-561-x. \$6.00 (trade); \$4.50 (text edition).

Recently we have been swamped with books on *personality*. This anthology of 41 essays is considered a compilation of the leading contributors in the field. Among the essayists are anthropologists, biologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, educators, and sociologists. A large number of the contributions were printed elsewhere and are collected in one volume for the benefit of students who would have difficulty in gaining access to them.

Kluckhohn and Murray have prefaced the volume with an Introduction and a lengthy discourse in which they outline a "Conception of Personality." While setting their sights upon a *dynamic organismic conception of personality* they admit that, owing to the hidden nature of the processes involved, such a goal is difficult of attainment. After rejecting most of the past efforts in this direction they go all out for the "first comprehensive dynamic theory of Personality," which is none other than the psycho-analytic theory and method of Sigmund Freud. There is an attempt by a few of the essayists to criticize some of the cruder formulations of Freud but usually he gets in by the back door.

All of the contributors seem to have about the same conception of man as the editors who declare (p. 29): "Whatever else they may be or may become, human beings are and must always remain animals; and this unalterable fact sets definite limits to the extent to which suppression of biologically given needs can go with benefit either to the individual or to the group of which he is a member."

"We are all agreed," they further elaborate, "that personality is an organization of some kind," "and should be defined as the entire sequence of organized governmental processes in the brain from birth to death." Or again, "Personality is the organization of all the integrative (regnant) processes in the brain." In the whole book there is never the slightest hint to the real nature of man, his spiritual soul and his otherworldly destiny. The main function of the personality is to reduce tension. These tensions are multitudinous and have to do with the problem of self-expression, conflicts, scheduling future actions, social conformity and identification, aspirations, etc. Pleasure, the ultimate goal which personality is to achieve, is produced not only by reducing these many tensions but the very process of reducing tension creates pleasure.

The main criticism that can be made derives from the almost complete preoccupation of all the essayists with abnormality. There is not a single case of a *normal* human being in the whole book. For the same reason most of the results are negative. Many of the samples are too small and serious contradictions are frequent. There is also a tendency to draw far-reaching conclusions not warranted by the material.

Although the symposium is brilliantly conceived in outline and actually covers the whole field of personality it could hardly be recommended as a text for students of social psychology. Owing to its comprehensive character it might serve some purpose as a book of reference.

S. A. SIEBER, S.V.D.

Chicago 14, Illinois.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION. By Robert H. Lowie. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1948. Pp. ix-465. \$4.50.

MAN AND HIS WORKS. By Melville H. Herskovits. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. Pp. viii-678-xxvii. \$6.75.

Both these books by prominent anthropologists will be of interest to our members. Lowie's text is the less ambitious of the two, but makes easier reading for college lower classmen. He centers his work on social organization only, including examples, however, not only from primitive tribes, but from civilized peoples of history. Certain theoretical criticisms and statements are to be found in the first three chapters. Chapters follow successively on such social institutions as kinship, marriage, property, law, religion, and education; and on what Lowie terms "social units": the family, unilateral descent groups, social strata, sodalities, and the state; with four short chapters in conclusion on the social organization of the Crow Indians, the Buinese of the Solomon Islands, the Shilluk of Africa, and Imperial Austria to 1914. The book might well be used, under direction, as an early undergraduate text, or as supplementary reading for the introductory course. It seems, indeed, to be intended for this purpose, although there are frequent references to statements by anthropologists who are named, without any explanation of their differing theoretical positions or place in anthropological literature.

Herskovits provides a monumental, all-inclusive textbook in cultural anthropology. After some general discussion of the nature of culture, he devotes a number of chapters to the evolution of man and culture, the structure of culture, the aspects of culture, cultural dynamics and cultural deviation. Under the section entitled "Aspects of Culture" he includes chapters not only on the major social institutions and "units" of Lowie's book, but adds chapters on economic organization, the arts, folklore, drama and music, and language. Rejecting the extreme economic determinism of Marx, though he recognizes the significance of the part played by economic life, he concludes (p. 288) that "there are too many societies whose dominant orientations lie in non-economic aspects of life for us to attribute to the economic phases of culture more than the functionally variable, albeit subsstantially significant influence they exert in providing the material base, without which no human activity can be carried on."

Herskovits' purpose has been to give the known data of cultural anthropology; his own theoretical position and views; and the views, with his approval, or criticism, of the major anthropologists, and psychologists who cover matters of concern to anthropologists. Father Wilhelm Schmidt comes in for some criticism. Herskovits is interested in culture rather than in social organization. He discusses such problems as the possibility of laws of culture and of prediction, and adopts a position of cultural relativism (considering moral ideas as universals, but not absolutes). With adequate direction, the book can be recommended for textbook use: it is possibly the best in the field.

EVA J. ROSS

Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.

RURAL MEXICO. By Nathan Whetten. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. xxv-671. \$10.00.

Rural Mexico is a study in Rural Sociology. More specifically, it is a study of the success or failure of the Mexican Revolution. Interpreting the Revolution in terms of the struggle of the Mexican people for land, Doctor Whetten concludes that: "The Mexican Revolution must be considered as a long-term process undertaken and guided in the interests of long-time public welfare. . . . When the achievements and failures of the Revolution are balanced against each other and when they are considered with reference to the likely alternatives that would have prevailed, one is lead to the conclusion that, despite all the mistakes that have been made and the injustices that have been committed, there is still a net positive balance in favor of the revolutionary program" (p. 563).

Let no one think, however, that this is a work of propaganda. It is, rather, the work of a sincere scholar who has obviously tried to work his way beneath conflicting interests and ideologies and to pass objective judgment as a sociologist on what has taken place.

The entire study is focused on the land problem. A revealing analysis of the problem is given with reference to the geographical environment. A lengthy historical summary explains the various types of landholding in the past, and the development of the large *hacienda*, the object of revolutionary attack. Extensive statistical reports give the record of land distribution and offer an estimate of success or failure in terms of efficiency, production, etc.; they also give a detailed picture of population trends, housing, standard of living, health and mortality.

Most interesting is the author's lengthy description of the collective farming that operates under the *Ejido* system. He believes that, along these lines, real progress may be made.

The author is very frank about the serious difficulties besetting the attempts at land reform: the corrupt practices of so many revolutionists and government officials; the backwardness of many Mexican peasants; the many mistakes made in the division of lands; local civil strife; the lethargy of the Church in the face of crying social need; the unfortunate direction taken by the Sinarquista movement; the antagonism between Church and State when "Religion could be a most powerful force in the rural communities of Mexico for bringing about improvements in the standard of living" (p. 481).

The study covers many controversial points, and Catholics will probably take issue with the author on some of his historical discussions. Otherwise the book presents a frank summary of the whole troubled rural problem of Mexico, and a wealth of statistical material which sociologists will appreciate. The book has an extensive bibliography and an excellent index.

JOSEPH P. FITZPATRICK, S.J.

Fordham University, New York 58, N. Y.

FIJIAN VILLAGE. By Buell Quain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. xvii-459. \$5.00.

This is an anthropological study of the one hundred people who constitute the small village of Nakoroka on Vanua Levu in the Fiji Islands. The limited area of the study enabled the author to give a remarkably complete account of all the aspects of social life of this small community. The book includes a history of Nakoroka, a lengthy description of each of its twelve households; their means of livelihood, based largely on gardening; their system of chiefs and castes; kinship, life cycle with its attendant ceremonies; and their present confused norms of status and prestige.

Mr. Quain describes the original culture as based upon hereditary ownership of land with matrilineal inheritance; maintenance of social solidarity and achievement of prestige by gift giving; social intercourse organized around and regulated by the moiety. A conquest of Tongan invaders superimposed on this a system of hereditary chiefs and the influence of the Wesleyan religion. The British established control later on and have organized this and many other villages around a hierarchy of appointed chiefs. The result is a conflict of cultures and values which has serious effects upon the personality particularly of the male members. Men are preoccupied with questions of status; but undefined means of attaining it leave them in constant anxiety. Other sources of cultural strain are the threat of British business ideals to the communal generosity of kinship groups, and the attraction of work for wages which isolates men from the social solidarity of their native communities.

This study contains a mass of material; but, unfortunately, Mr. Quain died before he had completed his analysis of it for publication. Ruth Benedict attempts to supply this lack by an introduction and a closing chapter. These are brief and were intended to be sketchy. They serve to indicate the rich possibilities for further analysis of Mr. Quain's data for those who will care to work it over.

The book has a glossary of Nakorokan names and titles, a brief bibliography, and a good index.

JOSEPH P. FITZPATRICK, S.J.

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THE CRIMINAL AND HIS VICTIM. By Hans von Hentig. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. Pp. viii-461. \$6.00.

In a previous volume published by Dr. Hentig and entitled *Crime: Its Causes and Conditions*, it was announced that it would be followed by another, devoted to the biological aspects of crime. The volume under review seems to be the one then promised, though nowhere does the author say so.

The volume opens by a part entitled "constitutive factors and crime." A vast number of subjects is treated, more exactly, touched upon, such as prenatal conditions, red hair, ugliness, tattooing, marijuana, and so on. But sex and age are not, probably because they have been taken care of in the previous volume. The second part is devoted to "the sociobiological elements of crime." The somewhat mysterious term is nowhere ex-

plained; it covers gangs and mobs — under the misleading title of “protective and pseudoprotective groups”; migration, rural-urban and across the ocean; occupation and religiosity in their relation to crime. The study of the latter is declared to be “an insoluble task.” The third part is entitled “geophysics and crime.” It discusses, on three pages, the influence of climate and then shifts to the study of the daily, weekly and yearly cycles in crime and of a few other subjects. By the way, how could the author have come across the idea of treating the purely cultural institution of the week among “geophysic factors”? The fourth and last part, to which the author seems to ascribe particular importance, is entitled “the victim.” It consists of statements about the legal limitations of possible victims of some crimes — for unknown reasons, the author believes that rape can be committed only against a female, *mostly up to eighteen years* (italics mine, N.T.); of cursory remarks about the classes of victims, such as young and old, female and mentally defective; and of similar remarks about some psychological types of victims. Dr. Hentig believes that his insistence on the victim opens new approaches to the detection and prevention of crime. No particular suggestions in these directions are however offered.

The range of the topics discussed by the author is wide, but the particular topics are treated in a rather cavalier manner. Heaps of information derived from various sources are thrown together. Commonly, the items describe some aspect of individual or social pathology, often lacking criminogenic relevancy. Time and again, information is out of date; thus for instance, the author reproduces, in present tense, statements about immigration from sources published 20 to 25 years ago. In some places, outstanding contributions to the subjects treated in the book are ignored, such as Linesmith's study on drug addiction, E. Sutherland's masterful refutation of the feeble mindedness theory of crime, L. Kalmer's and E. Weir's as well as Bongers's studies on religion and crime.

Summing up, one can say that Dr. Hentig's volume does not comply with the present day standards of science as a body of knowledge built up on observation — in the framework of a system of concepts related by “theories” or at least hypotheses. Without any unifying view, numerous and diversified information, such as presented by Dr. Hentig, remains sterile.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

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PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN FROM CRIMINAL CAREERS. By John R. Ellingston. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948. Pp. x-374. \$5.00.

One of the reasons this book is a significant contribution to the study, understanding, and control of delinquency is that practical applications are made to delinquency control in action as exemplified in the California Youth Authority. Granting that much remains unknown in the area of crime causation, the author feels that most of the means used today to “prevent” or “control” are ineffective because we have been treating symptoms rather than causes. To remedy this situation Ellingston pro-

poses a new approach in three broad areas: 1) understanding the delinquent; 2) setting up machinery geared to this new understanding, and 3) securing or training the personnel to administer the program.

Much of what is said in the book has been said before but here for the first time we have an attempt to carry out these "new" theories on a state-wide basis. For instance, the philosophy underlying the understanding of the delinquent is Christian in essence: "Every human being is sacred. . . . Human rights come before all other rights. . . . Man is the son of God and the agent of the divine plan. . . ." (pp. 343-344). In discussing the basic psychological needs (for emotional security and for adequacy are considered the two most important), the author notes that this represents no new discovery "for Christ pointed them out to mankind two thousand years ago." (p. 33). Even so, there are some elements in the philosophy which leave something to be desired, such as the reference to the "scientific disproof of old dogmas" (p. 345) and the approval of the attack on the "theologians of the early Middle Ages" who introduced "the emphasis on motives with their doctrines of free will and of original sin." (p. 13). But free will is not denied: "There is in us all an element of free will. As he grows older the individual's responsibility for his judgments and actions necessarily increases." (p. 39).

Some clue to the author's views on causation may be given by a few key statements: for the adolescent denied normal satisfactions, delinquent behavior is just as normal and purposive as football and dancing (p. 329); we make a mistake in expecting adolescents to behave like adults (p. 28); fear is no deterrent to those who are ready to commit crime (p. 43); mass custody leads to brutality (p. 87) and correlatively, prisons do not reform (p. 84); blaming parents for delinquency is oversimplification of a complex problem. (p. 266).

Setting up the machinery to handle the problem is not purely theoretical since Ellington has been on the inside track in the development of the model Youth Correction Authority Act of the American Law Institute, has aided a Citizens Committee to adapt the act to California and get it through the Legislature in 1941, and has kept in close contact with developments ever since. The Youth Authority's activities in the correctional field are threefold: 1) diagnosis; 2) training and treatment; and 3) replacement of offenders in the community.

Finding and training the personnel to do the job has not been easy and resistance was met from institutional workers which led, in at least one instance, to sabotaging the program. Nevertheless, the Authority scored personnel gains by applying the principle of fluidity, by reducing caseloads of probation and parole officers, by raising standards, and by providing training facilities with the cooperation of the colleges.

What of the results of the program? Although advanced tentatively because of the short period of time, the recidivism rate for 6,628 boys and girls over the four-year period 1943-47 was about 14.96 percent, a figure which compares very favorably with the 70 and 80 percent found in studies made in Massachusetts and Illinois, and in California before the Youth Authority went into action.

Anyone interested in the control of juvenile delinquency and adult crime should read and digest this book. The recital of the failures under the present system, followed by the account of the successes under the Youth Authority plan should stimulate thinking and encourage efforts to adapt the plan to all states.

GERALD J. SCHNEPP, S.M.

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ECONOMIC FACTORS OF DELINQUENCY. By Cletus Dirksen, C.P.P.S. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1948. Pp. 94. \$2.00.

To the already fulsome and complex literature on the etiology of juvenile delinquency, Fr. Dirksen's unpretentious volume contributes little of either empiric or analytical value. It can be classified rather more as an essay on the lack of Christianity in our economic system than as a scientific investigation of the relationship between delinquency and economic factors. On the level of social philosophy, Fr. Dirksen is critical of the competitive and amoral orientation of contemporary economic thought and activity and finds its fruit in the delinquency variously correlated with urbanism, housing and poverty. His empirical evidences of these correlations are drawn from standard but somewhat dated materials which are not sufficiently integrated and oversimplify the situation. To the non-professional reader these facts and the accompanying platitudes, ethical judgments, and solutions may offer a stimulus for much profitable thought, but for the scientifically minded professionals in the field of delinquency the inadequacies of the study in perspective and content are many. Perhaps its limited value for sociologists concerned with the scientific status of the relationships considered is best reflected in the author's statement that "delinquency can be laid at the door of the economic system in some manner as part of its illegitimate offspring." (p. 66)

JOHN D. DONOVAN

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SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION. By Robert E. L. Faris. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948. Pp. viii-481. \$4.50.

The author states in his preface that this work is not primarily concerned with "social problems" or "social pathology" since these are to some extent consequences of social disorganization. He therefore believes that an understanding of "the basic sociology of disorganization is requisite for intelligent solution of such 'social problems'." However many of the topics treated are those usually covered in texts on social problems and social pathology.

The nature of social organization, disorganization and personal disorganization are well presented in the opening chapters. Under the heading "Reactions to Economic Disorganization and Poverty" such subjects as strikes, industrial fatigue, the Molly Maguires, beggars and shelter inhabitants are considered. Crime, suicide, the vices, family and political disorganization occupy six chapters. Mental abnormality is discussed almost entirely within the framework of the ecological studies

made in Chicago. The section on mass behavior and social movements contains timely and dramatic examples, such as the Detroit Race Riot and the Father Divine Movement.

Catholic readers will disagree with the statement on page 31 that morality is entirely social in origin and has little meaning apart from the standards of society. Neither will they subscribe to the viewpoint expressed on page 113 that "the theological concept of free will and sin required no further examination of the causal circumstances, and thus offered no stimulation to science." The author can scarcely be referring to the Catholic doctrine of free will which did not prevent Pope Clement XI and Filippo Franci, a priest, from establishing institutions in the eighteenth century for the rehabilitation of wayward boys.

This book is well suited for courses in Social Disorganization and Social Problems. It is regretted that in his final chapter on Stability in the Postwar Era the author failed to include a discussion of Communism beside his treatment of Fascism in Germany.

JOHN J. KANE

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THE NEGRO GHETTO. By Robert C. Weaver. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948. Pp. xviii-404. \$3.75.

This is the most comprehensive and serviceable volume on the problem of housing for the Negro minority group that has yet appeared. Written prior to the Supreme Court's decision (May 3, 1948) illegalizing racial restrictive covenants, it has as its author the man who prepared the socio-economic memorandum used in the case against restrictive covenants before the Supreme Court.

Weaver has a wide background of experience in government housing agencies and in the American Council on Race Relations. He has brought together a mass of hitherto scattered material.

His analysis of the influence of minority groups on property values opens new ground. He leads to the conclusion that "when significant social and economic factors in tenancy are kept constant and race becomes the only variable, few if any differences are observed in the quality of property maintenance, conditions of occupancy, and neighborhood standards, and property values do not decline with Negro occupancy." The conclusion is not new, but no one has so carefully identified the premises or isolated the factors that are part of it.

He includes a thorough discussion of the comparatively recent "occupancy standards agreement" worked out in the "borderline" Kenwood-Oakland area in Chicago, which commit owners and occupants to observe and assist in the enforcement of all ordinances and codes covering property in the community. Negroes and whites agreeing to these provisions are able to live in the same community.

Weaver is right in insisting that the major difficulty in solving the problem of housing for Negroes in northern communities still remains — namely, opening up "white" areas to bi-racial living. He charges with convincing evidence that the strategically placed Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has stood in the way of housing for Negroes

in "white" communities. The efforts of other agencies to break segregation have often been confusedly and ineptly undertaken and then panically abandoned under the first show of opposition. At great length Weaver shows that segregation must be abandoned or all efforts at slum clearance and urban rehabilitation will forever remain a chimera.

Throughout, the emphasis in the book is amoral. This despite the fact that the hardest task in achieving integration will be found in the practical art of establishing community acceptance of the principles which are the moral foundation for insisting on bi-racial living. If "economic man" were not a myth, Weaver's economic arguments would alone do the job. True, in his last chapter Weaver does acknowledge the value of moral education and commends the pronouncements of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the National Catholic Welfare Council opposing segregation. But in the whole treatment the need for broad moral re-education appears in quite a subordinate position.

Still, some excuse must be granted to Weaver because, except for general education on the national level, religious leaders have on the community level been painfully slow to challenge and to change the racial attitudes on the members of their congregations. It frequently seems, indeed, that the leaders of labor organizations have done a more thorough job with their membership.

DANIEL M. CANTWELL

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SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT IN OLD AGE. By Otto Pollak. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948. Pp. xi-199. \$2.00.

This report for planning research on social adjustment in old age has drawn its conceptual framework from sociology and psychology. It is designed to stimulate and guide research about the social aspects of aging with the hope that the findings from the social field may clarify and supplement research findings upon the biological phases of old age.

Increase in interest in research concerning all aspects of adjustment in old age is shown to be a result of the relative increase of the aged in the population. Then, too, the value system of our society (which has been sharpened and clarified in recent years by competition with societies having a different system of values) requires the extension of the general well being to all groups particularly to those at a disadvantage in caring for themselves. The increase in life expectancy has made old age a possibility and hence a concern for all people and has resulted in a more generalized wish that old age be rendered a secure and productive period of life. It is assumed that the contemporary American family of the middle economic class with its two or three children, its restricted living quarters, and its rigid limitation of its family members to the father, mother and children does not offer a suitable institutional unit for the care of an aged grand-parent.

The need for study looking toward the development of other institutional units to provide social outlets for the aged person who has lost his marital partner through death, his occupational status through retire-

ment, and who finds himself in old age in extreme isolation at a time when social contacts are of increasing importance for him, is suggested. If social adjustment of the aged person is related to his efforts to getting on successfully with others it can readily be seen that the developmental or case study method of the entire life span of the individual is appropriate. Later maturity and old age are seen as additional periods of life into which the individual takes with him the habits, attitudes, and philosophy of living which he has developed in his years of growth and which will influence the adjustment which he will make. The report suggests, however, that many old age problems result from changes in social opportunities and expectations and that research centering upon improved social opportunities for the aged is needed. The emphasis which our society has placed upon qualities emanating from youth such as an adventurous spirit, high energy, and individualism has delayed recognition of acceptable patterns of living which clarify the role of the aged and give status to him. The individual who dreads the loss of status through becoming aged endeavors to adapt his way of living to that of persons younger than himself, and this strain may result in inner conflict and confusion. The study suggests that if the cultural group gives clarity and status to the role of the aged and provides for the realization of his wish for association with others, the lot of the aged in our society would be more consistent with the value judgments of that society.

The report contains an appendix on sampling for old age research and an extensive bibliography which will prove useful to those undertaking research in this field.

RUTH REED

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AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Muzafer Sherif, with an Introduction by Gardner Murphy. New York: Harper & Bros., 1948. Pp. xv-477. \$4.00.

Sherif offers a systematic social psychology based in part upon his earlier experimental studies of social perception and the formation of social norms or values. His present contribution represents a healthy trend in such texts away from the presentation of a poorly organized mass of data on personality and collective behaviors, and toward the organization of the subject matter in terms of a central unifying theme: the psychological and social determinants of personality and group membership.

A wealth of recent experimental and other investigations, including ethnological and sociological, are effectively utilized by the author in discussing biogenic and sociogenic motives, the formation and modification of attitudes, the development of the ego and ego-identifications, the social determinants of personality and behavior, the effects of technological change upon attitudes and groups, individual variations in social behavior, and the behavior of individuals in crisis situations. Pertinent records of World War II experiences are introduced.

One fruitful aspect of recent experimental social psychology is well summarized by Sherif: the construction of type situations in the labora-

tory where all stimulus and response factors are subject to control. The results of such experiments are then checked against the pertinent descriptive studies of groups-in-information produced in the earlier research of such sociologists as Thrasher, Shaw, Whyte and others of the Chicago school. The result is a developing discipline containing usable principles of importance to practitioners in group work, group therapy and intercultural education.

The experimental data reviewed in the long central portion of Sherif's book supports the accepted position in current social psychology that there is no dichotomy in the principles governing individual behavior and group behavior. This does not mean that an "individual" psychology is capable of explaining adequately behavior in social situations. There is also to be considered the total effective social situation stimulating the organism and to which the organism or individual selectively responds. The concrete behavior or reaction is "an outcome of the functional interdependence of all (internal and external factors) operative at a given moment." (p. 158) The individual, the group situation, and the individual's selective perception in that social situation, are the interdependent variables to be explored empirically in interpreting the particular social response. As reference points (or outstanding features) in the social situation change, the individual's experience and response is correspondingly altered. Generous use is thus made of the contributions of the late Kurt Lewin.

This book under review is not an elementary textbook (comparable to Klineberg's, for example). It is in the nature of a contribution to the effort to systematize, if not synthesize, the multiple investigations made in the area between psychology and sociology. As a contribution to a *science* of social behavior, it is the best review of research in the field since the Murphy-Murphy-Newcomb work of a decade ago. Its weaknesses and inadequacies stem largely from the fact that it operates on the assumption that man's nature and social behavior are capable of being understood completely, in time, through continued scientific investigation. "The final crucible for testing the validity of a hypothesis [in social psychology] is experimentation when it is feasible." (p. 2) Man's social nature, we are told, is due to "the relatively much greater size of his frontal lobes" and "Religion and other values . . . are products of group interaction." (p. 93). Thus naturalism and relativism are assumed throughout the discussion of the formation of norms or values. Excessive use of "etc.", parentheses, and forward references are minor flaws. A name index is offered in lieu of a formal bibliography.

As in most texts and studies in social science, sources identifiably Catholic are absent. In this field, as in others, there is a need for many more researches such as have been made (in psychology) over the years by T. V. Moore and his students and by P. H. Furfey. (Their distinguished and pertinent contributions, incidentally, are not in evidence in Sherif's work.) A collaborative volume by Catholics in psychology, psychiatry and sociology, dealing with normal and deviant social behavior seems desirable — a volume which would combine the sound

philosophical and theological basis of Father Herr's book with the empirical coverage exemplified in the text here reviewed.

JAMES J. BURNS

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TRENDS IN PROTESTANT SOCIAL IDEALISM. By J. Neal Hughley. New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. Pp. xiii-184. \$3.00.

The social gospel is interpreted in this small volume as a phase of a certain distinctive type of religion — American liberal Christianity. It is the application to society of certain fundamental principles and perspectives which grow out of definite theological, philosophical and social views.

The essential position of six key figures in American Protestantism is presented, together with the author's own evaluation of them. In reviewing the life work of such men as E. Stanley Jones, Charles A. Ellwood, Francis J. McConnell, Kirby Page, Harry F. Ward and Reinhold Niebuhr, one becomes aware that American Protestant thought is largely divided into two camps, in so far as such thought relates itself to the social gospel tradition.

The first group stands within the broad, many-sided stream of a gospel committed hopefully to social reconstruction. The second group is composed of men who seek to refashion the whole structure of religious ideas associated with the social gospel. There is a world of difference, therefore, between the Kingdom of God idealism of E. Stanley Jones and the dialectical theological socialism of Reinhold Niebuhr.

One major weakness in contemporary Protestant thought is to regard religion as first and foremost an instrument of cultural change. All else is regarded as secondary to this central function, even when personal redemption is taken into account.

The author has succeeded remarkably well in presenting a difficult and controversial subject.

JOHN J. O'CONNOR....

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EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS. Washington 6, D. C.: The National Educational Association of the U. S., 1948. Pp. xix-241. \$1.00.

The suggestions and recommendations contained in this book and resulting from a cooperative effort by numerous people and groups, are to be welcomed as an invaluable help for elementary — and high school teachers and should not be neglected by college teachers and students either. The responsibility for establishing a world at peace lies heavily on the teacher who has to prepare the next generation for life in a world which still is in a turmoil. In order to fix the goal of an education for international understanding the sponsoring committees and sixteen experts worked out a list of ten marks of, what they call: the world-minded American. One of the main chapters develops these traits in fuller detail. And another chapter presents ways and means how to learn experiences in international understanding. Many concrete in-

stances are offered as convincing illustrations. A well organized list of reading material and sources is added.

This sincere, intelligent, and practical volume of approaches to and recommendations for education in international understanding is of a particular interest for sociologists, American or foreign ones alike. It could be written only in this country, and, as it stands, can probably be put to practical use only in USA schools. Why is that so? Which changes in method have to be made in order to adjust the book to the actual educational opportunities in other countries? How far may this educational plan if studied abroad contribute to changing other nations' ideas about us and thus become an instrument for education in international understanding itself? Finally, this volume shows how much teamwork of intellectuals can achieve in the realm of science and its application.

As Catholic sociologists, however, we have to point to the fact that the "marks of the world-minded American" which do not neglect to stress the need for acquiring skill and judgment in studying world affairs and which go so far as to recommend the development of a capacity for empathy do not once mention the need for the adoration of God; the authors would certainly have considered this a sectarian attitude. It is a supposition, obviously taken for granted by the authors, that general recommendations for international education have to be secularistic. This too, alas, is a characteristic trait of our American culture.

RUDOLPH E. MORRIS

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CHRISTIANISME ET SOCIÉTÉ. By Robert Kothen. Louvain: Ed. E. Warny, 1948. Pp. 260. No price indicated.

Abbé Kothen, whose book *Marriage the Great Mystery* appeared recently in English (Newman Bookshop, Westminster, Md.), in the present volume presents considerations on the causes and remedies for the contemporary sickness of human society. The book seems to draw some of its inspiration from the ideas of Peter Maurin and Father Furfey's *Mystery of Iniquity*, which is quoted.

It is Christian doctrine, says the author, that although God created man and his social nature good, original sin and its consequences together with Satan's action on society have deeply disturbed the divinely willed order of things. The Christian runs the danger either of conformism by compromising his own convictions, or of refusing to adapt himself where adaptation to the needs of the times is legitimate and necessary for fruitful action on social life. His is the difficult task always of being genuinely in the world and acting upon it without becoming worldly, of discriminating between circumstances in which adaptation would be unlawful compromise and circumstances in which such adaptation is not merely lawful but a necessary means of exercising his influence in the direction of Christian ideals. He must be an exemplary *homo socialis* and respond to the appeal of the Church to influence and mold the society in which he lives closer to the Christian ideal, a task which re-

quires the development of Christian social teaching and its embodiment in the facts of social and political life.

ERNEST KILZER, O.S.B.

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SHORT NOTICES

THE RECRUITMENT, SELECTION, AND TRAINING OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS. By Elbridge Sibley. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948. Pp. xv-163. \$1.50.

This excellent study is one of immediate importance to all university and college administrators, all teachers of the social sciences (specifically, sociology, anthropology, economics, government, history, and psychology), and all who are contemplating graduate work in the social science field. The shortage of trained social scientists for current needs, led to the exhaustive study of a selected group of universities and colleges as regards recruitment and selection of social science students, undergraduate and graduate training, and the financing of graduate students. The conclusion was reached that while university social science departments are recruiting a reasonable share of the better students, they are not turning out a reasonable proportion of superior social scientists in comparison with the natural scientists (p. viii). The fault is laid to the general lack of formal training in methods in both graduate and undergraduate classes.

Undergraduate schools are accused of confining themselves largely to "the dispensation of descriptive factual information and ethical pronouncements" (p. 69): introductory courses in high school in some measure, and certainly in college, ought, Dr. Sibley contends (to the complete satisfaction of this reviewer) to "include practice in the application of elementary scientific methods to social data" (p. 77). Graduate schools are urged to look to the limitation of enrollments by more careful selection of candidates, to the avoidance of allowing students to gain degrees by sheer persistence (p. 53), to more individual attention (p. 93) and (a possibly debatable point, though somewhat in line with necessary methods training) to cease requiring the graduate student to "spend a vastly greater part of his time absorbing old facts than in learning how to establish new ones" (p. 5). One cannot recommend this work too highly, especially to those sincere Catholics who are anxious to spread the influence of the Church by aiding and encouraging Catholic scholars capable of earning the respect of the outside world by works of genuine scholarship.

EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie Press, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1948. Pp. x-207. No price given.

Representatives of schools specializing in divinity, medical, business, legal, and engineering education, met in an Inter-Professions Conference on Education for Professional Responsibility at Buck Hills Falls, Pa., in April 1948. This volume contains their collected addresses, centering on the objectives, content and method, and social and humanistic aspects of professional education. A brief bibliography completes the volume.

Dean Donald K. David of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration made the opening remarks, stating that the object of his School is: "a) to help people learn the art by teaching them significant, accumulated, scientific knowledge (and what is significant may change rapidly), by helping them develop the ability to continue to add to their accumulation of such knowledge, and by helping them develop the artistic skills needed to apply such knowledge to situations in which they find themselves. b) To add to the body of scientific knowledge through research." (p. 13). Not all the other speakers adopted so broad an approach, but the whole makes interesting reading for educators in general.

PHYSICS AND POLITICS. Re-issue. By Walter Bagehot. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. Pp. xxvi-230-vii. \$2.75.

Our members do not need to be told of the importance of this re-issue. It will be a godsend to those teaching the history of sociology, and who do not live near enough to libraries to have their students refer to the original, as previously printed. Jacques Barzun has written an interesting introduction, although sociologists might wish that he had a more sociological approach and insight into the significance and place of the book in sociological literature.

RURAL LIFE IN PROCESS. Second edition. By Paul H. Landis. New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1948. Pp. xix-538. \$4.00.

As in his earlier work, Landis takes the materialistic, environmentalist view which is usual when the social process is over-stressed. Those who know the worth of the former edition will be glad to learn that the new edition is even better than the first, and up-to-date particulars and modern statistics are well integrated throughout. All who teach rural sociology courses will welcome this book as one of the best in the field for comprehensiveness, teachability, and up-to-date information.

IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Helen Silving. New York: Oceana Publications, 1948. Pp. 84. Paper bound: \$1.00.

HOW TO BECOME A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES. By Margaret E. Hall. New York: Oceana Publications, 1948. Pp. 82. Paper bound: \$1.00.

These two handbooks provide full, accurate, and well-assembled data for all those interested in the subject matter. Students of immigration and naturalization, American history, American minority groups and similar topics will find in them valuable supplementary material. Librarians will welcome them for general reference.

LABOR AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION. Revised edition. By D. A. McCabe and R. A. Lester. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1948. Pp. viii-373. \$2.75.

This is a revision of the sixth volume of the series of six small books intended for classroom use for an introduction to economics (surely this break-down in size alone would recommend the series to teachers thoughtful of the carrying capacity of their students!). Intended merely as an introduction, the book well fulfils its purpose: it is not complete enough to be used as a text for a course in labor economics. The book

might also fill the need of the general reader, since its four parts give a brief survey of the rise, growth, and structural pattern of organized labor; labor legislation; social security; attacks on capitalism (including a reference to those of Leo XIII), with a long detailed chapter devoted to socialism, Russian communism, and the recent socialization in Great Britain. Because the authors have kept within the field of economics, and have not attempted to relate the problems raised with Christian ethics, they have not made clear the Catholic position on socialism, which does not consider present-day Britain to be socialistic because private property taken over by the state's exercise of the right of eminent domain is compensated with a regard for justice.

NURSING FOR THE FUTURE. By Esther Lucille Brown. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1948. Pp. 198. \$2.00.

Miss Brown prepared this report for the National Nursing Council, to give brief information about the extension of health services and future demand, with general proposals for the future role of the professional nurse, and for the education of the professional and non-professional nurse. The report would seem to be of high importance to schools of nursing. It makes a plea for financial aid to existing schools on the basis of educational standards rather than the auspices under which they are operated, and for a wider democratization of recruitment.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

FRANCISCAN SOCIAL REFORM: A STUDY OF THE THIRD ORDER SECULAR OF ST. FRANCIS AS AN AGENCY OF SOCIAL REFORM ACCORDING TO CERTAIN PAPAL DOCUMENTS. By Theodore Anthony Zaremba, O.F.M. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1947. Pp. xxi-507. \$4.50.

Here is an explanation and commentary on pertinent historical facts of value to those interested in the history of the Church in general, and Franciscans in particular. The study is concluded by a bibliographical essay on Franciscanism. Sociologists will wish that Father Zaremba had related his subject matter to their own specialized interest.

SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS, WARD, SUMNER, AND COOLEY. By Sister Mary Edward Healy, C.S.J. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948. Pp. xii-159. \$1.75.

Devoting a chapter to each of the four writers studied, the author of this valuable study for our members followed a fixed plan in writing a brief biography and finding for each, their definition of society, their idea of material, formal, efficient, and final causes, and the implications of such concepts for social change and social control. A final chapter sums up the findings under each of the headings, makes statements of similarities and differences, and ends with a statement that for the topics studied the findings of each depended upon their philosophy of life: "Fundamentally, the concepts of society and social change or social con-

trol are based on the concepts of man's nature, origin, and destiny." (p. 150).

CATHOLIC COLLEGES AND THE NEGRO STUDENT. By Richard J. Roche. O.M.I. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948. Pp. vii-245. \$2.50.

From written reports and personal interviews in 1944, the author secured information from 154 Catholic colleges on admission policies regarding Negroes; reasons for exclusion (only 76 had ever accepted Negroes as students); and psychological and social problems attendant on admission. Yet even as Father Roche was conducting his researches, some institutions long thought to be strongholds of unChristian prejudice and adaptation to social discrimination, were opening their doors to colored students. The details which he gives of good adjustment situations will be useful especially to those who are now contemplating a change of entrance rules, or who have but recently done so; the whole of this study should be read by all Catholics who wish to keep themselves informed of the facts of Catholic practice.

PERIODICAL REVIEWS

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Recent articles with special pertinence for Catholic sociologists

AllinSmith, Wesley and Beverly. "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude: A Study of Eight Major U. S. Religious Groups." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (3): 377-89. Fall, 1948.

In the March issue of the *Annals of the American Academy*, Liston Pope reported on the relationship between religious affiliations and socio-economic status as disclosed by public opinion polls (cf. "Periodical Reviews," June, 1948). The present article reports an investigation of the hypothesis "that the politico-economic orientation of a religious group can be predicted from the group's occupational status (or from parallel information); and that politico-economic differences *within* a group are again a function of occupational status" (pp. 378-79). The authors consider this hypothesis confirmed, except for the Jewish group in the United States.

On a question of governmental responsibility for economic security, they found a perfect rank order correlation between occupational status and opinion, *i. e.*, the greater the proportion of urban manual workers within the group the greater the proportion in favor of "guaranteed economic security." The Jewish group, however, was second only to the Catholic in its stand

for governmental guarantees, but lowest in the per cent of urban manual workers. Since within each Christian denomination there was a clear gradation — business, professional, and white collar workers tending toward individualism, manual workers toward security — it was concluded that economic role rather than religious affiliation determined opinion on the matter. This conclusion was supported by further investigations of educational attainment and economic level, and of an opinion poll on labor's influence and the vote for Roosevelt in 1944. It is suggested that religious identification operates on the national level only as a "latent cross-pressure," exercising a determining influence only under certain conditions, as among Jews at present, and potentially among Catholics and Protestants (as shown in the election of 1928).

This study confirms a view which is already widely accepted. But what are the occasions which activate the latent cross-pressure? Are there any issues which would provide exceptions to the rather broad conclusion of the authors? What is the actual process of opinion formation and maintenance within the groups? Further studies are needed to reveal data bearing on these and other questions.

Barrère, Alain. "Revision et développement du 'catholicisme social'?" *Etudes*, 81 (258): 75-94. July-September, 1948.

This is an attempt to evaluate certain general tendencies of "social Catholicism" which all who are concerned with social action should find interesting. The definition of the term is quoted from Marcel Prélôt, "*il est une politique sociale tendant à l'humanisation du milieu social*" (p. 76). Hence social Catholicism is distinguished from the social teachings of the Church, which express the "*exigences du Christianisme en matière sociale*" (p. 76). The latter are principles flowing more or less directly from dogma, which require application to concrete situations. It is the duty of the **Christian** to search for the technical means to translate principles into institutions, laws, and rules for living.

Social Catholicism, starting with the Church's teaching, constructs a doctrine pointing toward action. This doctrine has a revolutionary character, since it proposes the substitution of one order, that of the person, for another, that of the individual isolated by Liberalism and submerged by Marxism. Social Catholicism is not simply intermediary between these latter movements, on the plane of doctrine it is transcendent. But on the plane of politics it has been reformist and not revolutionary, in part because revolutionary action in the past has meant violence.

An intelligent contemporary politics must be based upon scientific knowledge of conditions. Has social Catholicism availed itself of such knowledge? Has it been productive in the field of economic science? Admitting that science as such is "neutral", Barrère holds that Catholics have been too much content with "political solutions" when directives for action may

also be drawn from economic science, as Keynesian theory has demonstrated.

Revision of the working doctrine of social Catholicism is difficult. Past successes have produced a "line" which may be followed even when it is no longer suited to changing events. Moreover, the doctrine has a harmony and synthesis, a reflection of revealed truth, which makes it appear "settled". Too, the further one becomes removed from the statement of principles in the direction of their concrete application, the less certain the terrain on which one must work. The more social Catholicism succeeds, the more it comes to appear "official", and the more difficult it becomes for it to take the advanced positions required by the "*travaux de détail*" of application.

Unlike other contemporary social doctrines, social Catholicism is assured of its source. For the application of the Church's teaching, however, economic science is indispensable. Science cannot be subordinated to doctrine, but in some degree doctrine can legitimately orient the researches of the scientist. Economic theory is to some extent involuntarily enclosed within the personal preferences of economists, in the sense that their doctrines give a point of departure to their research, though through their varying emphases a body of pure science is continuously being built. Doctrine must have contact with economic science for its own clarification, correction, and elucidation, and for its translation into action. Two fields of research are emphasized for Catholic social scientists: the theory of structures and the theory of intervention.

Finally, the author concludes that a revision of the politics of social Catholicism is necessary. Conditions have radically altered through a revolution not directly willed by men. The capitalist system has arrived at a point

where neither reformist nor revolutionary action bear on it, hence the opposition between reformism and revolution has become meaningless. The new politics must be creative. While only faith discloses the profound significance of contemporary social change, reason must discover its temporal meaning. This means the recognition as an ultimate objective of a conception of the temporal City, the designing of immediate objectives which will create gradually a new social milieu, and the determination of political action in function of the most dynamic elements of social evolution. That evolution is now replacing the bourgeois world with the world of the workers. Cooperation of bourgeois and workers' elites can result in constructive action which will insure the orderly development of the evolution toward the good society. These are the lines along which it is contended that revision of doctrine should proceed.

* * *

De Coninck, L., S.J., "Problèmes de l'adaptation en apostolat. IV. La paroisse réadaptée," *Nouvelles revue théologique*, 70 (1): 48-66. January, 1948.

Since this is the fourth article in a series (cf. "Periodical Reviews," June, 1947), it should be placed in the perspective of the general problem under discussion. The author notes at the outset two conceptions of the apostolate which confront each other: conservation and conquest. In view of the historical development of the parish and its fixed territory, its character as a social group is sometimes overlooked. Parochial life is so constituted as to encourage traditionalism, even routine, and in this perspective the parishioners become only those who are reached in at least the solemn moments of life. But the parish actually includes more than the "really faithful" — all the

baptized and the non-baptized as well are confided to the pastor. Hence conquest as well as conservation is its mission.

The parish is not to be viewed as an institution isolated from the rest of the world. It can live healthily only in accord with the "social laws" of community development. The location of parishes, their size, the types of services they offer, etc., must be seen in relation to ecological and sociological facts. Trends in community growth have brought a kind of displacement for the Church, but the parish as a unit still offers certain definite advantages: (1) it occupies a territory, thus providing a localized and perhaps historic symbol; (2) it has a permanent staff, present in the locality; (3) the parochial edifices manifest "a city of God in the milieu of the city of men"; (4) there is a given population within which to work. If the parish fails to make an impact, to conquer, it may be because it is a victim of "institutionalism". In such a case, steps must be taken to adapt its organization and restore its collective consciousness. Above all, it must not be forgotten that the parish is more than a human group; it is also a part of the Mystical Body of Christ.

The role of the parish is discussed under three heads: (1) liturgy, (2) instruction, and (3) works. With regard to liturgy, it is the parish which organizes for the faithful their contact with God through Christ, the Eternal Priest. The formal meeting — at least weekly for all — must be made truly significant through explanation and the participation of the faithful. The return to the offices is considered the necessary preliminary to the return to Christian life. It is because of the lack of an adequate education that a "paraliturgy" has arisen, sometimes in bad taste, sometimes well-intentioned as an

approach to the fuller appreciation of the liturgy itself. Research in religious folklore and historical usages might help in the development of such educative approaches.

The teaching mission of the Church is likewise central. From the point of view of the apostolate, it may be seen that all revolutions require doctrine. Within the parish this means the necessity of preaching — and the author insists that the laity needs and wants light on daily problems, not oratory. It means also a stress upon catechetical instruction, both formal and informal (through home visits, casual conversation, and the like).

In its works, the normal function of the parish is not, directly, conquest. But the parish forms the faithful who are conquerors, who can penetrate the masses. This penetration must take place in a variety of milieux, for the "masses" or "youth" or similar classifications are not homogeneous. The command to teach embraces all, but special attention must be given to the problem of the proletariat. Does the parish organization suffice for reaching this segment of the population?

The Christian community lives not uniquely in the parish but in the world. Hence problems of the apostolate cannot be solved on a local plane alone. There is need for the organization of industries and professions, for the extra-parochial extension of Catholic Action, and for auxiliaries of the parish. Christ must be introduced wherever men gather together; hence the conception of the apostolate cannot be narrowed to the parish. But the parish continues to serve basic needs, and at least on Sundays the faithful are seen united in their families and in it.

Ranwez, Pierre, S.J., "L'influence des milieux sur la vie religieuse. Informations recueillies au Congrès de Lille," *Lumen Vitae*, 3 (2): 247-65. April-June, 1948.

The subject of the parish, under the title "*Structures sociales et Pastorale paroissiale*," was also considered at the sixty-third Congress of the *Union des Oeuvres Catholiques de France*, held at Lille in 1947. This article summarizes some of the contributions to that meeting. The author remarks that it furnished justification for inquiry into social environment and action upon it, and for the method of study proposed by Professor Gabriel Le Bras (cf. "Periodical Reviews", October, 1948).

At the Congress Professor Le Bras presented some of the practical justifications most familiar to historians and sociologists, the Dominican Fathers Lebreton and Congar presented theoretical considerations weighing more heavily with theologians, *i. e.*, the necessity that priests have access to accurate diagnoses of the needs and difficulties of their flocks in order to exercise their pastoral functions, and that as builders of the Church they must know the secular structures which, since they are human, are the materials of construction. Techniques of parochial inquiry presuppose the close collaboration of priests and lay persons. A parish priest at the Congress reported that in addition to the information obtained through an inquiry in his parish, he was able to make friendly contacts with his people, to evaluate the influences of social factors antagonistic to the spiritual life which he could not attack alone, and to comprehend more adequately a proper attitude toward the "baptizing and leavening" of social movements within the parish. Père Lebreton commented that in this domain, in effect, sociological research is an expression of fraternal charity.

Priests and laymen have different spheres of action after the facts have been ascertained. The proper sphere of the latter is in secular activities, building healthier social structures and adjusting human relationships toward fraternity and charity. A factory director of Grenoble described the ideals and methods — *e. g.*, wage-fixing, facilities for education and apprenticeship, welcomes for new arrivals, etc. — by which he sought to implement his zeal for justice and charity. The priest, through his teaching function, transmits the doctrine which the laity express in concrete reality, and in his ministry brings the blessing of the Church to men as they are moulded by the realities of their lives. The experiences of a Parisian pastor are cited. Since it is impossible for the priest to influence his vast parish directly in a multi-group society, the laity must bear the immediate responsibility, under the guidance of the priest. There must be easy access to priests, neighborhood organization of parishioners, methodical infiltration through Catholic Action, advance-guard contacts through priest-workers and the like, and occasional large-scale action as exemplified by parish missions. Techniques must be adapted to rural villages as well, for they have not been spared the effects of contemporary social change.

A free translation of the text of the concluding statement of the Congress is given here, for the benefit of readers who may not otherwise have access to it:

"1. The society actually offered to our evangelization grows more and more complex. Within it powerful structures assert themselves and develop and exercise social pressures such that individuals can scarcely remain free persons.

"2. In consequence, it is necessary to inaugurate action which will operate within these different structures. This is the specific and irreplaceable role of the laity, aided and supported by movements of specialized Catholic Action.

"3. This action proper to the laity is possible and efficacious only in the measure that the pastor himself

— recognizes the existence of these structures,

— is conscious of their influence upon human life and especially of their repercussions in the domain of religious life,

— discovers the lay persons capable of animating and transforming them in a Christian manner,

— attempts to equip spiritually the Christians engaged in all these sectors of human activity.

"4. Besides, it is necessary to realize on a local plane a Christian community of cult and of charity open to all: this is the parish, a living and apostolic unity. To accomplish this, pastoral action of priests working as teams is indicated, as is the intervention of teams of laymen with their priests, within the general category of Catholic Action.

"5. The confusion of structures and of the exigencies of a loyal submission to human reality in apostolic work make it necessary

— either to pass beyond the limits of the parish for action within a quarter of a city or a canton,

— or to recognize within these same limits the existence of more restricted spheres of living to which it is necessary to give a soul.

"6. It is desirable to know the scientific means available for obtaining the knowledge to which Christian apostles must be initiated. Diocesan bureaus for the study of pastoral sociology would be able to render many

services. They would facilitate the knowledge of the structures themselves and put this knowledge into effect through the most efficacious techniques of action. They would permit the elaboration of a pastoral ministry fully adapted to the concrete situations, sometimes so delicate, in which the Christians of today are engaged.

"7. If the laity is directly responsible for the social structures, the sanctifying and teaching roles of the priest become more important as these structures themselves become more complex. It must also be recalled that pastoral science does not dispense from the interior life and that in the final analysis it is grace alone which, transcending the indispensable human efforts and the necessary progress of technique, reaches human souls: in spite of all social pressures, it is capable of working miracles.

"8. Given the central role of religious families in the general work of evangelizing the modern world, their effort will have only to gain in influence in consideration of the preceding remarks."

* * *

Simon, Yves R., "On the Foreseeability of Free Acts," *The New Scholasticism*, 22 (4): 357-70. October, 1948.

The relevance of this article is indicated in the author's statement that

"by recognizing that virtuous acts, under certain circumstances, admit of being foreseen, we imply that some amount of foreknowledge can be exercised in the more formal and in the most formal part of social science" (p. 370). The discussion concerns, not predictability, founded in the most general sense upon determination, but foreseeability, "the perception of a future event in its proper cause" (p. 367), founded upon intelligible determination. Events of nature may always be foreseen conditionally, but the free act is unforeseeable in the absence of any factor making for the unique determination of means, *i. e.*, it cannot be seen in its cause though it may be predictable enough for statistical generalizations. Foreknowledge is possible where the observer knows both the virtuous disposition of the agent's will and the particular circumstances which render wrong every course of action except one and do not permit abstention from action—but this foreknowledge differs from that regarding events of nature, since it arises neither from the nature of the will nor the perfection of the virtue, but from "the relation obtaining between a uniquely determined means and the good to which virtue adheres" (p. 367). Since society is a work of virtue, there is a basis here for formal sociological interpretation.

INDEX TO VOLUME NINE

(March, June, October, December 1948)

ARTICLES

Callahan, Edward R., S.J., <i>Divorce—A Survey</i>	162
Curran, Charles A., <i>Family Counseling</i>	152
Dunn, Edward S., S.J., <i>Catholics in the 80th Congress</i>	254
Fichter, Joseph A., S.J., <i>The Development of the Individual within the Social System</i>	179
Fitzpatrick, Joseph, S.J., <i>The White Collar Worker and Wall Street</i>	98
Furley, Paul Hanley, <i>On Defining Sociology</i>	19
Furley, Paul Hanley, <i>The Verbal Interpretation of Social Documents</i>	272
Hynes, Emerson, <i>The Place of Rural Sociology</i>	108
Kane, John J., <i>The "Tops and Bottoms": A Study of Negro Gangs in West Philadelphia</i>	74
Mihanovich, C. S., <i>A Statistical Study of the Legal Grounds for Divorce in the United States</i>	173
Mueller, Franz H., <i>The Social Question of the Shop</i>	84
Nuesse, C. J., <i>The Relation of Financial Assessment to Status in a Rural Parish</i>	26
Queen, Stuart A., <i>The Sociology of Jose Medina Echavarria</i>	39
Robinson, Leo J., S.J., <i>Towards a Juridical Order</i>	3
Ryan, Louis A., O.P., <i>The Characteristics and the Social Role of Woman</i>	230
Schnepp, Gerald J., S.M., <i>What America Is Doing to Accommodate Displaced Persons</i>	9
Timasheff, N. S., <i>Observation in the Social Sciences</i>	259

NOTES OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTEREST

Mihanovich, C. S., <i>Opinions of ACSS Members</i>	191
Rosenfelder, Richard, S.J., <i>March 26, 1948: Ten Years Old</i>	46

BOOK REVIEWS

Baerwald, Friedrich, <i>Fundamentals of Labor Economics</i>	61
Banay, Ralph S., <i>Youth in Despair</i>	206
Barbash, Jack, <i>Labor Unions in Action</i>	213
Barnes, Harry E., <i>An Introduction to the History of Sociology</i>	123
Bergin, Thomas G., and Fisch, Max H., <i>The New Science of Giambattista Vico</i>	290
Bossard, James, H.S., <i>The Sociology of Child Development</i>	125
Bowen, Ralph H., <i>German Theories of the Cooperative State with Special Reference to the Period 1870-1919</i>	121
Brennan, Robert E., O.P., <i>The Image of His Maker: A Study of the Nature of Man</i>	140
Brown, Francis J., <i>Educational Sociology</i>	57
Burrows, Edwin G., <i>Hawaiian Americans</i>	65
Carr, Lowell J., <i>Situational Analysis, An Observational Approach to Introductory Sociology</i>	124
Chamberlain, Neil W., <i>The Union Challenge to Management Control</i>	211
Chapin, F. Stuart, <i>Experimental Designs in Sociological Research</i>	120
Chase, Stewart, <i>The Proper Study of Mankind</i>	285
Clark, Helen I., <i>Principles and Practices of Social Work</i>	62
Coon, Carleton, <i>A Reader in General Anthropology</i>	206
Cuber, John F., <i>Marriage Counseling Practice</i>	128
Cuber, John and Harper, Robert, <i>Problems of American Society</i>	204
DeSchweinitz, Earl, <i>People and Process in Social Security</i>	132

Dirksen, Cletus, C.P.P.S., Economic Factors of Delinquency	297
Doob, Leonard W., Public Opinion and Propaganda	214
Edwards, Newton and Rickey, Herman G., The School in the American Social Order	56
Ellingson, John R., Protecting Our Children From Criminal Careers	295
Fairchild, Henry P., Race and Nationality As Factors in American Life	129
Faris, Robert E. L., Social Disorganization	297
Fromm, Erich, Man for Himself	138
Fryer, Lee, The American Farmer: His Problems and His Prospects	60
Gillen, John, The Ways of Men, An Introduction to Anthropology	206
Gladwin, Harold S., Men Out of Asia	208
Glenn, John M; Brandt, Lillian and Andrews, F. Emerson, Russell Sage Foundation, 1907-1946	139
Goldberg, Harriet, Child Offenders	126
Goldwin, Eric F., Two Way Street, The Emergence of Public Relations Counsel	215
Groves, Ernest D. and Gladys H., The Contemporary American Family	51
Hafkesbring, Hanna, Unknown Germany, An Inner Chronicle of the First World War	218
Hayes, Wayland J., The Small Community Looks Ahead	202
Herskovits, Melville, Man and His Works	292
Horner, Francis J., Case History of Japan	219
Hughley, J. Neal, Trends in Protestant Social Idealism	302
Inglis, Ruth A., Freedom of the Movies	216
Kershaw, John D., An Approach to Social Medicine	66
Kluckhohn, Clyde and Murray, Henry A., Personality in Nature, Society and Culture	291
Konvitz, Milton R., and Murphy, Arthur, Essays in Political Theory	288
Kothen, Robert, Christianisme et Societe	303
Lang, Frank, Workingmen's Compensation Insurance: Monopoly or Free Competition?	61
Lockridge, Frances, Adopting a Child	134
Lowie, Robert H., Social Organization	292
Lundberg, Emma O., Unto the Least of These	63
MacIver, R. M., The More Perfect Union	209
Maddux, Percy, The Case for Adoption	134
Mayer, J. P., Sociology of Film: Studies and Documents	55
McCormick, Mary J., Thomistic Philosophy in Social Case Work	131
Merrill, Francis E., Social Problems on the Home Front	203
Nelson, Lowry, Rural Sociology	127
Nelson, William S., The Christian Way in Race Relations	211
Newcomb, Theodore M., and Hartley, Eugene L., Readings in Social Psychology	64
Nimkoff, Meyer F., Marriage and the Family	53
Odum, Howard W., Understanding Society	54
Paradise, Viola, Toward Public Understanding of Case Work	218
Pollak, Otto, Social Adjustment in Old Age	299
Quain, Buell, Fijian Village	294
Rennie, Thomas A., and Woodward, Luther C., Mental Health in Modern Society	220
Ross, Eva J., Sociology and Social Problems	205
Ross, Malcolm, All Manner of Men, The Racial Crisis in America	210
Schmiedler, Edgar, An Introductory Study of the Family	51
Schneider, Louis, The Freudian Psychology and Veblen's Social Theory	199
Sherif, Muzaffer, An Outline of Social Psychology	300
Shils, Edward, The Present State of American Sociology	288
Smith, T. Lynn, Population Analysis	198
Sorokin, Pitirim, The Reconstructing of Humanity	197
Taylor, Carl C., Rural Life in Argentina	201
Terman, Lewis M., and Oden, Melita H., The Gifted Child Grows Up	135
Truxhal, Andrew G., and Merril, Francis E., The Family in American Culture	53
Turner, Paul, They Did It in Indiana	217
Von Hentig, Hans, The Criminal and His Victim	294

Weaver, Richard M., <i>Ideas Have Consequences</i>	139
Weaver, Robert C., <i>The Negro Ghetto</i>	298
Whetten, Nathan, <i>Rural Mexico</i>	293
Witte, Raymond P., <i>Twenty-Five Years of Crusading</i>	200
Zacharias, H. C. E., <i>Protohistory</i>	136
National Educational Association, <i>Education for International Understanding in American Schools</i>	302

SHORT NOTICES

Bagehot, Walter, <i>Physics and Politics</i>	305
Borgardus, Emory S., <i>The Development of Social Thought</i>	67
Bowman, H. A., <i>Marriage for Moderns</i>	222
Brown, Esther L., <i>Nursing for the Future</i>	306
Brown, G. O., <i>Medical Essentials for Students of the Professions Allied to Medicine</i>	68
Chambers, M. M., <i>Youth Serving Organizations</i>	222
Clump, C. C., <i>The Economic and Political Life of Man</i>	221
Fitch, Florence M., <i>Their Search for God: Ways of Worship in the Orient</i>	142
Frazier, E. Franklin, <i>The Negro Family in the United States</i>	221
Geddes, Donald P., and Curie, E., <i>About the Kinsey Report</i>	222
Grant, D. F., <i>So! You Want to Get Married</i>	67
Hall, Margaret E., <i>How to Become a Citizen of the United States</i>	305
Hartnett, Robert C., <i>Equal Rights for Children</i>	144
Jurgela, C. R., <i>History of the Lithuanian Nation</i>	143
Keller, A. G., <i>Starting Points in Social Science</i>	145
Landis, Paul H., <i>Rural Life in Process</i> , 2nd Ed.	305
Lubac, Henri de, <i>The Unmarxian Socialist: A Study of Proudhon</i>	221
Magner, Rev. J. A., <i>The Art of Happy Marriage</i>	67
Maynard, Theodore, <i>A Fire Was Lighted</i>	68
McCabe, D. A., and Lester, R. A., <i>Labor and Social Organization</i>	305
McCall, R. A., <i>Basic Logic</i>	68
Perrin, Henri, <i>Priest Workman in Germany</i>	142
Pieper, Joseph, <i>The Human Wisdom of Saint Thomas</i>	144
Saint-Pierre, A., <i>Temoignages Sur Nos Orphelinats Recueillis et Commentes</i>	68
Sibley, Elbridge, <i>The Recruitment, Selection and Training of Social Scientists</i>	304
Silving, Helen, <i>Immigration Laws of the United States</i>	305
Sutherland, Edwin H., <i>Principles of Criminology</i>	67
Zimmerman, Carle C., <i>Outline of Rural Sociology</i>	143
Carnegie Institute of Technology, <i>Education for Professional Responsibility</i>	304
Committee on Labor Market Research Council, <i>Memorandum on University Research Programs in the Field of Labor</i>	145
Ecole Sociale Populaire, <i>La Vie Rurale</i>	144
National Catholic Rural Life Conference, <i>A Survey of Catholic Weakness</i>	143
National Catholic Rural Life Conference and the Institute of Social Order, <i>The Family, Church and Environment</i>	223

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

Healy, Sr. Mary Edward, <i>Society and Social Change in the Writings of St. Thomas, Ward, Sumner and Cooley</i>	306
Roche, Richard J., O.M.I., <i>Catholic Colleges and the Negro Student</i>	307
Zaremba, Theodore Anthony, O.F.M., <i>Franciscan Social Reform</i>	306

MISCELLANEOUS

News of Sociological Interest	47, 119, 194, 283
Periodical Reviews	69, 146, 224, 308

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